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Abstract
For many decades, demand for agricultural commodities has remained stagnant
and its growth has been limited. In contrast, agricultural production continues to become
ever more efficient by increasing output for stable or decreased inputs. Long-run profits
have historically been near zero due to an ongoing relative equilibrium. But recent U.S.
energy policy has changed to include a Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), the goal of
which is to boost domestic energy independence in an environmentally sound way. Most
of the RFS in the near-term relies on the production of 15 billion gallons of ethanol made
from corn. This has the effect of creating a new sector of demand for grain corn and
subsequently supports rural economies.
The RFS creates a new demand for 5.5 billion bushels of corn by 2015. At the
corn-ethanol conversion ratio of 2.7 gallons per bushel, this will sustain the production of
15 billion gallons of ethanol. The RFS is a blending floor imposed on gasoline refiners.
Ethanol producers, on the other hand, are not forced to supply ethanol. While the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to implement the RFS, it does
not have the ability to expand ethanol supplies. The U.S. government has therefore
supported the use of ethanol through a current 45 cent tax credit for each gallon of
ethanol blended into gasoline. Other financial support programs such as grants and loan
guarantees are in place for ethanol refiners.
Ethanol in the U.S.is primarily made from the starchy molecules in corn. One
bushel of corn in a dry mill ethanol plant will produce approximately 2.7 gallons of
ethanol and 17 pounds of dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS) which can be used
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in livestock rations. A wet mill plant will produce other by-products. Ethanol can be used
directly in the nation’s fuel supply at limited levels of blending. Most cars in the United
States can withstand the corrosive nature of ethanol in blends of up to 10% or more. But
flex-fuel vehicles, which are able to operate on 85% ethanol are increasingly becoming
available for sale and their use continues to grow.
Corn ethanol is a very complex issue when implemented on such a large scale as
the RFS dictates. The amount of transportation fuel actually displaced by its use is a hotly
debated topic. In any case, the large scale production of corn ethanol has created a firm
link between agricultural markets and the energy sector. Ethanol is also an environmental
issue. One of the primary goals of the RFS is to combat global warming and whether or
not this is achieved it currently in debate. Aside from the climate change issue, there are
other environmental ramifications tied directly to ethanol such as contamination, water
use and land-use change.
Since the inception of the RFS, price volatility and uncertainty has never been
greater. In the first half of 2008, prices for all commodities reached historically high
levels. This raises the concern of the impacts with the RFS has on markets other than
corn. The livestock industry and other grain markets have been affected to some degree
by the RFS. This is in part due to the changing profile of the major trading participants in
the commodity trading centers.
All of this is related to a structural change which has taken place in the
agricultural markets as a result of the RFS. Historical relationships between price, supply
and demand have adjusted and currently continue to adjust. The reasons for the
adjustments are founded in economic theory regarding system-wide demand shocks. In
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this case, the demand shock is roughly a net 50% increase in the demand for corn by
2015 compared to the most recent decade. The adjustments which take place can be
summarized by three periods. In period 1, the demand curve shifts outward, equilibrium
is lost and higher corn prices are observed. In period 2, the market struggles to find a new
equilibrium by increasing output. This period is marked by increased volatility and
market participants over and under react to price signals until the new equilibrium is
discovered. Period three is represented by the discovery of a relative market equilibrium
at price higher than previously, but not as high as the initial demand shock.
Results from, a fundamental analysis of the grain markets show that the expected
market behavior has begun to take place and agriculture finds itself in period 2 of the
changes described above. While most of the price changes and acreage shifts can be
explained, the degree to which prices have increased are not fully explained. A change in
trading center activities (Boards of Trade, etc.) may help to further account for the new
prices. A survey of brokers shows that the behavior of commercial traders has
significantly changed since RFS implementation. Volatility and uncertainty have ensued.
The consequences of the RFS to the farmer have also been significant. Farm
income has increased significantly sufficiently to overcome the riding costs of fuel and
fertilizer. The risk exposure of farmers has also changed; the data indicates that exposure
to risk has increased greatly. However, the farm gate prices have been more than enough
to compensate for the changes in risk.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
When governments intervene in the market place, there are almost always
unforeseen and unintended consequences. The unintended consequences from minor
intervention into a specific commodity market may be contained within that commodity
market. However, when the intervention fundamentally alters the supply of or demand
for a commodity, the unforeseen and unintended consequence may not only be observed
within that commodity but may also be present in a number of other closely related
commodity markets, and in some cases may even spill over into other somewhat
unrelated markets. The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the economic
consequences of a major government intervention into a specific commodity market.
During the decade of the 1960’s, US farmers received just over $1 per bushel for
corn. Corn exports increased substantially in the early 1970’s and by the middle of that
decade farmers were receiving on average over $2.50 per bushel for corn. However, in
the 30 year period from 1976-2005 corn prices remained relatively stable, averaging
$2.35 per bushel over that time frame. There were only two years that the annual price of
corn for a marketing year was more than $0.50 per bushel higher than the average and
there were only two years when the marketing year average price was less than $0.50 per
bushel lower than that average.
During those 30 years, corn farmers saw a fairly steady increase in demand for
corn: feed seed and industrial use rose from less than a billion bushels annually to nearly
three billion bushels; feed usage increased from four billion to six billion bushels; and
exports remained level varying around 1.8 billion bushel. Why did prices remain stable
over those 30 years when usage increased from seven to eleven billion bushels annually?
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The answer is that corn yield increased sufficiently to supply the increasing usage. In
1976 the expected national average corn yield was about 90 bushels per acre and by 2005
it had increased to over 140 bushels per acre. Farmers have been the victims of racing on
their own technological treadmill to improve yield and cut cost per bushel. The result, as
economic theory would predict for a perfectly competitive market, is that the price of
corn has remained close to the break-even cost to produce corn for most producers.
Meanwhile, the world’s hunger for fossil based fuels has grown to extraordinary
levels. The theory of peak oil has also been a concern for many groups and has spurred
the relentless search for a so-called renewable fuel source in order to perpetuate the
availability of energy to man and industry.
And finally, increasing concerns about global climate change have pressured
special interests and governments to seek a means of minimizing the impacts of human
consumption of resources. In many schools of thought, man’s consumption of resources
and specifically fossil based fuels, emits unsustainable levels of greenhouse gases (GHG)
into the atmosphere, which leads to uncontrollable climate change. These scientists argue
that in order to maintain a sustainable planet and end environmental injury, GHG
emissions must be reduced to natural or even a net negative level.
In the last few years, the US government has responded by creating legislation in
response to lobbying pressure from corn growers wanting a higher price for their grain;
anti-oil lobbying wanting to reduce our dependence on oil, particularly foreign oil; and
environmental lobbying pressure to reduce our emissions of GHG. While this legislation
has shown up in a number of different places, two key pieces of legislation have been the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Security and Independence Act (EISA) of
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December 2007. These two pieces of legislation created federal mandates for the amount
of US produced, corn based ethanol that must be blended into our national gasoline. This
created a federally mandated increase in demand for corn to be used to meet the ethanol
requirements.
Objectives
The overall objective of this thesis is to evaluate the direct economic impacts of
the US ethanol industry on the US corn industry and to also document some of the
unintended economic consequences in the corn industry and other agricultural industries.
The three specific objectives are to:
1. determine if there has been a structural change in the supply, demand and
price relationship in the corn industry;
2. determine if commodity brokers believe that the futures market is still
effective tool manage price risk for their clients; and
3. determine how farm profitability and risk have changed as a result of ethanol
policy with its intended and unintended consequences.
Methods
The core of this thesis is to delve into the economic law of unintended
consequences. In one way or another, the extents to which the objectives of ethanol have
been met are superficially observed on a day to day basis. The economic effects of corn
ethanol at the farm level can be roughly identified, the energy issues can be weighed and
the environmental impact can be measured. But a deeper analysis may reveal that ethanol
has effects which reach much further than these segments of society. Since the rapid
expansion of ethanol, agricultural markets have experienced volatility which had not been
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previously observed. Farm and futures prices reached unforeseen levels and these
markets now seem to be tied to external markets more than ever.
Ethanol demand for corn has been the greatest single economic factor to impact
agriculture in many decades. Since the inception of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
risk patterns have changed, volatility has increased and participation in the major trading
centers has changed. With all of these changes, higher prices than have ever been
observed have come to pass in the commodity markets and may or may not be explained
by the traditional fundamental and technical factors. This paper explores the extent to
which structural change has occurred and the extent to which these changes are tied to
diverting capital and resources to biofuel production. Current primary and secondary data
are used to at least partially explain the associations of these changes to biofuel. The
primary focus of this study is how these market conditions relate to corn ethanol, as this
is the most prominent biofuel currently.
Thesis Organization
Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter will be a brief introduction
and background on the foundations of the ethanol industry. The first parts will review the
preceding legislative initiatives which led to the current policies as well as an overview of
the current U.S. biofuel policy. Following is an overview of the industry as it stands at
the time of this writing. Some simple statistics are given in order to visualize the makeup
of market participants and ethanol consumers. In order to understand many of the terms
related to corn ethanol issues, it is helpful to have reviewed this chapter before
continuing.
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In Chapter 3, a thorough review of current academic, government and industry
publications is given. A plethora of research has been done on issues related to corn
ethanol and its various impacts on economics, culture and the environment. Research on
some of these areas is limited, but an attempt is made to present all the topics which are
tied to ethanol production including the arguments made by both supporters and
opponents of corn ethanol.
Chapter 4 consists of a theoretical discussion about structural change. The
ramifications that the economy might expect to go through from such an imposing
artificial demand as the corn ethanol mandates are analyzed. It is followed by the
methods of analysis used to achieve the objectives and a brief description of the data
used.
Chapter 5 is a compilation of the results from testing the economic theories
related to ethanol production. The results will follow an outline similar to the objectives
laid out above. Namely, there will be a fundamental analysis of acreage shifts, pricing
changes and ethanol production from the corn supply of each year. Secondly, a survey of
country futures brokers is presented to qualitatively measure how the trading markets
have changed since the ethanol mandates have been put into place. Finally, the effects on
the costs and returns of farmers after the shocks of ethanol are analyzed. Chapter 6
consists of my conclusions and implications for various market participants. I will reflect
on what has been presented throughout the entirety of this thesis.
U.S. biofuel policy and its impacts on economic markets are complex and
significant. The reason why so much literature has been issued relating to ethanol is that
the topics of impact are seemingly endless. It is certainly difficult to objectively measure
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any of these changes but it is expedient to start with a basic, fundamental analysis before
drawing any conclusions regarding any one ethanol issue. The whole story must be told
and this is intent of this thesis.
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Chapter 2 – Biofuels Background and Ethanol Policy
At times the energy, political and rural economic sectors have been at odds with
each other but are cooperating for the common goal of replacing fossil fuels with
biofuels. Biofuels are defined by Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary as “a fuel (as
wood or ethanol) composed of or produced from raw materials.” Biofuels are different
from fossil fuels in that they are produced from recently dead organic materials as
opposed to fossilized hydrocarbons like oil or gas.
Biofuels are generally converted from organic material into either ethanol or biodiesel. Biodiesel is derived from vegetable oils like palm oil or soybean oil and refined to
a combustible form for automobiles. Ethanol is either derived from fermentation of
starchy goods like potatoes or grain, or from the cellulose in the other portions of plants
like wood, leaves and stems. The viability of each of these as an energy source ranges
according to each product and the technology used to produce them.. For example,
outside of economic conditions, the net energy balance (NEB) of cellulosic ethanol is
negative due to currently inefficient technologies. But altogether, biofuels continue to
gain prominence on the world stage as an answer to the challenges in the introduction.
The most prevalent of biofuels in the United States today is ethanol produced
from grain corn. The refining capacity for corn ethanol is expected to reach 13.5 billion
gallons in 2009. This is an increase from only 2.1 billion gallons in 2002.
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Figure 1. Corn Ethanol Production and RFS Mandates (1980-2015)

2007 RFS
2005 RFS
2002 Farm Bill

Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Environmental Protection Agency

Figure 1 is an illustration of this growth. The trend has largely been supported through
legislation and subsidies from the government which initiated the first pro-ethanol
mandates in 2002. The U.S. congress and supporting industry groups have cited the
challenges outlined at the opening of this paper as imperatives for moving toward cornbased ethanol. The legislation has since grown to include other biofuels such as biodiesel
and especially cellulosic ethanol, but current applies most directly to corn based ethanol.
By debatable measure, the expanded production and use of corn ethanol has
achieved its goals of stimulating agricultural markets, reducing dependence on foreign
and fossil fuels and putting downward pressure GHG emissions. Extensive literature has
been published regarding these issues. The current available store of academic research is
vast in its approach to biofuels from the perspective of agricultural, energy and
environmental economics. In some cases a general scientific consensus has been met
regarding the merits of corn ethanol. In other cases, the table is open for debate.

8

Policy and Legislation
It is vital to have a general understanding of the evolution of biofuel policies and
current legislation supporting ethanol use. Ethanol has been produced from corn since the
early 1980s but only entered the public arena in 1992. The policy regarding ethanol has
changed from exploration as a fuel additive to that of fuel replacer. While industry groups
have lobbied congress for years to expand ethanol production, government agencies have
been reluctant until recently to authorize active government support for the ethanol
industry. Today, the United States government supports ethanol use through subsidies,
blending mandates and capital expenditure guarantees.
Energy is the newest portion of farm legislation first appearing in agricultural
policy in the 1990 farm bill. This is also the first time energy was directly linked to
agriculture. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 was also one of
the first pieces of legislation to address global climate change. In fact, this was an
important enough item that it gained a section title in the 1990 bill. Contained within this
section was a program created to fund “biomass energy demonstration projects.” These
demonstration projects were established to support research in developing energy from
renewable and domestic sources. The demonstration projects were organized to stimulate
interest in biofuels as a viable replacement for conventional energy.
The next major support for ag-based energy development was organized in the
2002 farm bill. This time, energy was important enough to have its own title and section
dedicated to it. This legislation further funded research in biofuels and expanded its reach
to include hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. The provisions of the 2002 farm bill
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energy policy were limited to funding research but would give rise to a focus on
developing a sustainable bioenergy sector.
By 2005 enough interest in biofuels and specifically ethanol had been generated
that congress chose to actively integrate them into the nation’s energy supplies. The first
major step in the process of creating a viable bioenergy sector was the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. Most of this act was focused on developing other-than-bio sources of energy
such as nuclear and solar power. But as part of this legislation the RFS was first
established which set mandates for the amount of biofuels to be used as energy linked to
timetables. The RFS put biofuels at the forefront of alternative energy development. It
also authorized the first subsidy for fuel refiners who blend ethanol with conventional
gasoline. There has been a form of subsidy to refiners since 1978, when they started to
receive a waiver for a portion of the gas taxes for ethanol blended gasoline.
On December 19, 2007, President Bush signed the Energy Independence and
Security Act into Law. This legislation built on the previous bills and directed more
public resources toward developing the biofuels industry. The keystone of this law was
the expansion of the RFS. Initially, the RFS stipulated that 7.5 billion gallons of corn
ethanol be produced and blended by 2012 with an additional 250 million gallons coming
from non-corn biomass from 2012 onward (see figure 1). But the 2007 bill grew the RFS
to a total of 36 billion gallons of ethanol by 2022, 15 of which would be derived from
corn. A more detailed explanation of the RFS can be found below.
Finally in 2008, the aptly named Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008
(italics added) irreversibly linked the energy sector with agriculture. Funding in the 2008
farm bill has expanded to guarantee loans for ethanol refineries, expand research efforts,
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support biomass production and many other provisions. Although this law is directly tied
to the Energy policy of 2007, it is technically the current and periodic farm bill
legislation. What this means is that the biofuel supporting law in the Farm Bill is in
addition to the energy legislation of 2007.
The cumulative legislation related to biofuels and ethanol has amassed a great
deal of public attention and governmental complexity. But most of it can be categorized
into three basic areas: Blending mandates through the RFS, subsidies and loan guarantees
(financing) and exploration. Below a broad overview of each of these categories is given
in order to more fully understand the role of government in the development of the
ethanol industry as it stands today.
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS)
Some confusion exists surrounding the concept of the RFS. Many perceive it to be
a production mandate. While it mimics the attributes of a production floor, it is actually a
blending mandate meant to obligate transportation fuel refiners to blend a minimum
volume of ethanol and biodiesel into the domestic energy supply. Additionally, it is more
of a moving target than a fixed standard. There is no mandate that ethanol be produced.
There is, however, an EPA mandated blending wall which stipulates a blending ceiling of
10% for conventional vehicles. But combined with fuel for flex-fuel vehicles, there is
virtually no limit to the cumulative amount of ethanol which can be blended.
The RFS was first introduced in 2005 as a guideline of benchmarks for the nation
to reach each year over time, to finally achieve a goal of a certain level of biofuel use.
This first version of the RFS was quite timid compared to the 2007 modification of the
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standard. Table 1 outlines the phase-in of biofuels as legislated by the RFS. It was quite
simple and, in fact, was limited to mandating corn ethanol usage levels.

Table 1 – Renewable Fuel Standard 2005

Year

Renewable Fuels (Corn Ethanol)

2006

4.0

2007

4.7

2008

5.4

2009

6.1

2010

6.8

2011

7.4

2012

7.5

Source: Environmental Protection Agency

But in 2007, the current version of RFS was expanded to include more varieties of
biofuels. Not only was the goal for corn ethanol usage increased, but the new RFS
includes the mandatory blending of cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel. Additionally, the
new RFS differentiates the types of biofuels and classifies them by assigning a status
related to their actual GHG emissions and energy values. The current RFS is summarized
in Table 2.
The most notable differences between 2005 and the current version of the
standard are obviously the volumes mandated and the timeline of commitment to biofuel
use. The newest version has committed the United States to increasing ethanol usage at
least through 2022 with the aim of replacing up to 25% of the nations transportation fuels
with domestically sourced ethanol. Further discussion regarding the effectiveness of this
12

policy in reaching these goals can be found in later chapters. There is an especially large
deficit in current literature regarding the tolerance of current automobile profile and
Table 2 – Renewable Fuel Standard 2007 - 2022

Year

Corn
Ethanol

Advanced
Biofuel*

2008

9.0

2009

10.5

.6

2010

12.0

.95

2011

12.6

2012

Cellulosic
Biofuel

Bio-mass
Based
Diesel

Undifferentiated
Advanced
Biofuel**

Total
RFS

9.0
.5

.1

11.1

.1

.65

.2

12.95

1.35

.25

.8

.3

13.95

13.2

2

.5

1

.5

15.2

2013

13.8

2.75

1

1.75

16.55

2014

14.4

3.75

1.75

2

18.15

2015

15

5.5

3

2.5

20.5

2016

15

7.25

4.25

3

22.25

2017

15

9

5.5

3.5

24

2018

15

11

7

4

26

2019

15

13

8.5

4.5

28

2020

15

15

10.5

4.5

30

2021

15

18

13.5

4.5

33

2022

15

21

16

5

36

Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Environmental Protection Agency
* =Derived from renewable sources other than corn starch which reduce GHG emissions by 50%
compared to conventional gasoline
**=Must reduce GHG emissions by 60%

infrastructure of various levels of ethanol in fuel. Ethanol is highly corrosive and by some
estimates, 15% is the highest level which can be tolerated by current automobiles and
fuel handling facilities. The question regarding how the nation’s transportation fleet will
change is an urgent one. But today, the USDA is urging the EPA to raise the blending
wall to support the industry.
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It is crucial to understand the mechanism by which the RFS is implemented and
enforced. I will reiterate here that the RFS is not a production mandate but rather a
blending floor. It is set forth by congress and implemented as law. But the authority to
oversee and implement the RFS is delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), which has some limited freedom in the way it carries out the process.
Each year, national gasoline demand is projected by the U.S. Department of
Energy. From this projection, a percentage is calculated of the total gasoline demand
which would be required to meet the RFS. Then, according to the volume capacity of fuel
refiners, they are assigned a Renewable Volume Obligation (RVO). Fuel refiners are
required to demonstrate that they are in compliance with the RFS from year to year by
tracking the volume which has been blended through identification numbers which were
previously assigned to each “batch” of ethanol produced or imported. These Renewable
Identification Numbers (RINs) are specific to an individual lot of ethanol which tracks its
origin, volume and end destination. At the end of the refining year, the RINs are tallied
and used to sum up the total volume of ethanol which was blended for that given year.
Interestingly, these RINs carry more intrinsic value than a simple tracking device.
They can also be traded at the market and substituted for meeting individual refiners’
RVO. For example, if refiner A has difficulty in meeting its assigned RVO for the year, it
can purchase a surplus RIN from competing refiner B which may have surpassed its own
RVO for the year. Finally, the RINs can actually be saved or traded for the next years
RVO and subsequently count toward the national RFS. By decree the EPA allows up to
20% of the following years RVO can be met by the current years RINs given the RVO at
individual refiners has been surpassed.
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Therefore it is very apparent that the RFS is not a cut and dry mandate for a
sudden consumption of ethanol at a defined level from year to year. This insight provides
a deeper conceptualization of the background in how the RFS affects the farm and
agricultural economies.
Financing
Government has also extended its hand into the financing side of ethanol
economics. On the supply side, investors are given the opportunity to share risk with the
public through loan guarantees, grants and a guaranteed demand through the RFS. On the
blending side, fuel refiners are given federal tax incentives and subsidies to use ethanol in
their fuels. There are also many tax incentives at the state level, but these vary from state
to state and are too numerous to expound upon here. It is sufficient to note here that
individual states reduce the tax burden on refiners for blending ethanol at some level or
another in addition to the federal support. Many states also offer different programs in the
form of loan guarantees or tax credits for capital expenditures on ethanol processing
plants. But the most significant subsidy is at the federal level and is universal across all
states.
The subsidy is the most straight-forward of the financing support. The formal
name of this subsidy is the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC). The VEETC
provides the funding to support ethanol production through creating a demand-side
market for ethanol producers. The roots of the VEETC extend back to 1978 when ethanol
was given an exemption from the fuel excise tax. The new version (VEETC) removes
some of the prior restrictions for qualifying for the exemption such as blending limits.
When the VEETC was first authorized, it refunded 51 cents per gallon of each gallon of
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ethanol blended into gasoline. It was put into the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
and is intended to last through 2010. In the 2008 Farm Bill, the VEETC was reduced to
45 cents per gallon. The VEETC is larger ($1.01/gallon) for ethanol from advanced
biofuels, such as cellulosic ethanol, but our main subject here is corn-based ethanol.
It is estimated that $22 billion dollars will have been paid to refiners through the
VEETC by the end of 2010. No analysis will be provided here regarding the net returns
to the public by way of this tax credit, but considerable discussion could be generated if
interests were directed to calculate those levels. Another intriguing aspect of the VEETC
is the fact that it is set at a flat level and in no way tied to the profitability of ethanol
production or blending. Common sense would dictate that if the VEETC were necessary
to stimulate ethanol consumption, then the VEETC should fluctuate as the profitability of
ethanol rises and falls. The necessary size of the VEETC to make ethanol consumption
profitable would also provide an interesting topic for future research.
The final support for the domestic ethanol industry is a protective import tariff on
foreign-sourced ethanol. While this product is still subject to the same policies regarding
RINs and is treated as an equivalent substance, imported ethanol faces a 54 cent per
gallon tax until December 31, 2010. It was imposed to inhibit cheaper sources of ethanol
available to refiners from places like Brazil, which is the world’s largest ethanol
producer, from taking advantage of the VEETC. However, there is also a 2.5% ad
valorem tariff charged for all imports. The import tariff has seen two extensions, the
latest of which was in the 2008 farm bill adding two years to its implementation.
On the supply side, financial incentives to produce ethanol amount to a degree of
risk sharing by the public sector with private sector processors. If a market for ethanol
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was previously a mirage, the demand has been established by the RFS. And while many
investors may view the risk to benefit ratio too high for building a new ethanol plant, the
government has also set aside funding in the form of loan guarantees and grants.
Currently, grants are bestowed upon worthy projects which demonstrate the viability of
advanced ethanol from biomass refining. Corn ethanol is included as well. Biorefinery
Assistance Program ensures loan guarantees of up to 90% of principal and interest, not
exceeding $250 million, for building new and modifying existing bio-refineries. These
guarantees are subject to review on a project by project basis, but funding has been
mandated in set-asides for this program through fiscal year 2012.
New Bioenergy Development
This review would not be complete without mentioning the support for
developing new bioenergy sources. Corn ethanol is actually only the first and fastest
growing segment of the biofuel industry. But corn ethanol only makes up 42% of the
final year of the RFS. The other 58% is dedicated to coming from so-called advanced
biofuels, which are produced from cellulosic sources such as wood waste and corn stover.
Whereas in previous years, biofuel funding was directed to developing the corn ethanol
industry, that research and development has been shifted in the direction of developing
advanced biofuels. The commercial feasibility of these fuels is limited because of the
inefficient chemical technologies which now exist to break the cellulosic bonds in plant
materials. These chemical bonds must be broken down before the sugars can be
fermented into ethanol. Therefore, the research and development funding has been
aggressively placed into the pursuit of more efficient technologies. The funding for these
programs have been articulated in many legislative bills, including the Bio-Based
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Markets Program, the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels and the Biomass
Research and Development Program. These are contained in the farm bill legislation of
2008 but others have also been implemented through other avenues.
Much of the support for ethanol has materialized into legislation. Whether or not
this reflects the public sentiment toward ethanol is uncertain, but the legislation is so vast
and so brawny, that it has a definitive impact on the ethanol industry. Regardless of the
commercial feasibility of these ventures, the U.S. government has actively created a
demand-side market for ethanol and propped up the supply side through risk sharing.
The RFS creates a stable market for the fuel which may not be as predictable without the
legislative supports. The VEETC which refiners enjoy also sets a premium on ethanol
over other competitive fuel additives (note: ethanol is used as an octane enhancer and
used to replace substances such as Methyl-tert-butyl-ether. This is discussed below). The
import tariffs also protect the domestic industry. The effects of these policies on the
feasibility of the ethanol industry will be discussed in a later chapter, but future research
might be directed toward analyzing the stand-alone viability of the U.S. ethanol industry
without these financial and market supports.
U.S. Energy Use
In 2007, the United States consumed more than 100 quadrillion BTUs of energy
from all sources (EIA, 2008). Of this, only 7 percent was produced from domestic
renewable sources. Energy sources considered to be renewable include solar,
hydroelectric, geothermal, wind and biomass. Of all renewable energy produced in 2007,
biomass accounted for 53%. This equates to approximately 3.7% of the nation’s total
energy supply being derived from biomass. Energy produced from biomass in primarily
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converted into transportation fuels. Although a small portion is devoted to electricity
production, most is used to produce transportation fuels in the form of ethanol or
biodiesel. The majority of biomass converted into biofuels is produced from the
conversion of corn starch to ethanol. In 2008 a record 9.2 billion gallons of ethanol were
produced, primarily from corn, representing less than 1% of all energy consumed and
about 5% of gasoline consumption (EIA, 2007). On the other hand, nearly 23% of the
2007 13.1 billion bushel corn crop was used for ethanol production (RFA, 2008). This is
compared to 1.1 billion bushels used in 2002/2003 of a 9.5 billion bushel corn crop which
is roughly11.5%.
Ethanol Production
Ethanol is generally categorized by the source from which it is produced; these
two categories are corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol. Currently, the majority of ethanol
is produced from the starches in corn kernels. However, a large amount of research is
being devoted to developing technologies which can efficiently convert cellulose,
hemicelluloses and lignin into simple carbohydrates for further conversion into ethanol.
The presumed benefits of this so-called cellulosic ethanol is that dependence on corn
grain for fuel is reduced by using crop residues and other waste such as corn stover and
straw. In addition, alternative crops are being considered as potentially efficient supplies
of ethanol such as switchgrass, poplar trees (Steeves, 2006) and many others. The RFS
stipulates that at least 21 of the 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel be derived from
cellulosic and other sources while 15 billion gallons be derived from corn (RFA, 2008).
Altogether the total production capacity of the industry is 12.3 billion gallons and will
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continue to increase to meet the RFS. It is expected to increase to 13.5 billion gallons by
the end of 2009.
Currently, commercial ethanol is produced from corn in one of two processes: wet
milling or dry milling. Most of the 178 ethanol plants presently in operation use dry mill
processes (ACE, 2008). In the wet milling process, corn is soaked in sulfuric acid to
assist the separation of the kernels into the individual components comprised of the germ,
gluten and starch. The germ is then separated and used as the source of oil extraction. The
remaining starch and gluten goes through an additional separation process which frees
each part from each other. The starch is then processed into various products or
fermented into ethanol. The resulting products from the wet mill process are corn oil
(from the germ), dry gluten meal and ethanol. Corn gluten meal is used as a feed
ingredient for poultry production.
Dry milling is dedicated to producing ethanol and results in various byproducts.
This is in contrast to wet milling whereas the results are three co-products of corn. With
regard to ethanol production, therefore, dry milling is considered to be much more
efficient than wet-milling which is the reason that dry milling is the industry standard
today. In dry milling, the corn is immediately ground into flour without separation of the
individual parts. The meal is then mixed with water and a blend of enzymes which
decompose the starches into dextrose which is a simple carbohydrate. The slurry is heated
to reduce bacteria in the mix then cooled before having yeast added for fermentation.
After 48 hours, the alcohol is distilled out of the mash and concentrated to 190 proof and
further dehydrated to reach a 200 proof level (100% alcohol). When the alcohol is
distilled out, the remaining stillage is eventually processed and dried to produce dried
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distillers grains with solubles (DDGS). DDGS is considered to be a highly desirable feed
component in livestock rations because of its high protein and energy value. In the most
recent reports, dry milling has achieved a conversion rate of approximately 2.7 gallons of
ethanol per bushel of corn with 17 pounds of by-product remaining in the form of DDGS.
Ethanol is a highly competitive industry with a five firm ratio of 41% and a ten
firm ratio of 51% in terms of present production capacity (RFA, 2008). Large diversified
corporations such as Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) have entered the market
as well as numerous specialty producers. Currently 22 plants are under construction and
are expected to add an additional 2.2 billion gallons in capacity. In December 2008, RFA
listed 132 separate ethanol producing firms with a current capacity of 12.3 billion gallons
and a future capacity of 13.5 billion gallons when plants under construction were
included.
Ethanol Consumption
Ethanol demand has expanded rapidly in the past 5 years. Due to the government
mandated RFS, fuel refiners are required to blend increasing amounts of ethanol into
gasoline. The VEETC of $0.45 per gallon of ethanol used has supported blending in
proportions of up to 10%. This fuel mixture, called E10, is safe for use in all vehicles
currently in the United States (ACE, 2008). At this level, ethanol increases the fuel
mixture’s octane rating as well as engine performance. The reason ethanol was initially
introduced as an octane booster was to replace the outdated Methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether
(MTBE) which has been shown to be highly pollutant to air and groundwater supplies
(Duffield, 2006). At levels higher than 10%, ethanol becomes highly corrosive to
conventional engines and reduces fuel efficiency.
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Vehicles which can run on higher blends of ethanol are available. The most
common ratio is E85 where 85% of the fuel is ethanol and the remaining 15% is
conventional gasoline. These vehicles are called Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) because they
are capable of running on fuel blends as high as E85 or as low as E10. The parts are
specially manufactured to be highly resistant to the corrosive nature of ethanol. There
were approximately 297 thousand FFVs in use in 2006 compared to 179 thousand in
2003 (EIA, 2008). This number is expected to increase as car manufacturers address the
growing demand. EIA estimated that in 2007, 1.27 million FFVs would be “made
available” to the nation. Despite the growing number of FFVs on the road, the
substitutability of ethanol for gasoline is limited. The National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition
(NEVC) estimates there are a total of about 1860 locations which offer E85 in 44 States.
However, 71% of these locations are concentrated in the Midwest and in just 10 states.
Minnesota alone accounts for 356 of the E85 stations counted in the national total
(NEVC, 2008). One reason for the limited availability of E85% is that it must be
transported by individual trucks or train cars specifically suited for the corrosive nature of
this blend. E85 cannot be transported via pipeline like conventional gasoline.
Because the ethanol is still in its infancy, it faces many challenges in the future to
remain viable. One of the key issues relating to the growth of the industry is the ability of
the current infrastructure to cope with the increasing volumes and proposed increased
blending rates. Significant capital will have to be spent on specialized rail cars, tanker
trucks, car engine parts and even the components used in fuel pumps at gas stations.
There will also be the issue of a sustainable supply base. Although I will briefly address
this topic in the next chapter, the question should be asked if a sustainable supply or corn

22

crop can be produced to meet the 15 billion gallon portion of the RFS on an ongoing
basis. It may be possible to supply the 5.5 billion bushels of corn, but what is given up as
a result?
At the time of this writing, there is also a contractionary change taking place
within the industry. The collapse of the U.S. economy and crude oil prices has strained
the economic value of ethanol to refiners. This has led to numerous plants idling and/or
declaring bankruptcy. An inability to generate cash flow and/or to pay down principal on
capital expenditures has incapacitated at least 20-25 plants and has contributed to the
halting of operations on plants under construction. This includes the bankruptcy of the
largest ethanol producer firm, Versasun, which was forced to shut the doors at its 17
ethanol plants in November 2008.
What is unique to the ethanol industry is the role it has played in expanding the
demand side for the U.S. corn supply. In just 5 years, the industry has grown from
utilizing 1 billion bushels of corn, about 10% of production to utilizing 23% of the largest
corn crop in history. It has single-handedly shifted the demand curve outward to such a
degree as has not been observed in history. In the coming years it will continue to play
perhaps the most prominent role in grain marketing compared to any other channel of the
agricultural sector.
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review
Agricultural markets in the United States have experienced unprecedented
changes since 2005. While exogenous factors such as economic trends, oil prices and
others have all influenced these changes, none is as significant as the Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) initially signed into law in 2005. By so creating such a large artificial
demand for fuel ethanol as stipulated by the RFS, the government has sought to achieve
certain goals while the law of unintended consequences has been observed. The first
introductory sentence in FAPRI’s Model of the U.S. Ethanol Market states (FAPRI, June
2008, p3):
The United States ethanol market has become an epicenter of shocks to
agricultural commodity markets and a focal point of farm policy that
defies precise quantitative analysis.
This purpose of this chapter is to explore and analyze the arguments noted by the
antagonists and proponents of ethanol production from corn. Current literature is
reviewed to articulate these arguments and implicitly explain whether or not the goals of
the ethanol mandates are being achieved. Other issues are also addressed by referencing
academic, government and industry literature.
The extensive market for ethanol today in the United States would not exist
without the RFS formulated by the federal government of the United States. It is valid to
state that ethanol was in production long before the mandates of 2005, but the majority of
ethanol from corn was used for industrial purposes and its production was driven by open
market forces. But many industry groups contest that the benefits of ethanol far outweigh
the costs.
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The Renewable Fuels Association exists to “[promote] policies, regulations and
research and development initiatives that will lead to the increased production and use of
fuel ethanol (RFA, 2008).” The association represents the majority of investors and other
stakeholders who have a vested interest in the expansion of ethanol markets. They are
also the most prevalent and reasoned representatives of the ethanol industry. The RFA
provides numerous reasons why ethanol is beneficial. The reasons they cite as benefits
realized from ethanol use are environmental impacts, energy security, reduction of fuel
costs for consumers, boosting the economy and stimulating farmer income (RFA, 2009).
Energy Contribution of Ethanol
Energy security as a priority in the United States has gained increasing attention
and support due to rising crude oil prices and escalating turmoil in oil-rich regions of the
world. Biofuels have been viewed not only as a cheap alternative to oil-based fuels, but
also as a means of securing energy independence. An important key to understanding the
potential for biofuels to contribute to energy independence and the role which ethanol
might play is the net energy balance of ethanol production.
A variety of studies have been performed to estimate the net energy balance of
corn based ethanol since the late 1980s. Despite the number of studies performed, a wide
range of results have been produced and therefore no general consensus has been reached
on the matter. For example, Ho estimated the net energy balance of corn ethanol at
around 4000 British Thermal Units (BTUs) per gallon in 1989. This is compared to an
estimate of -33,562 BTUs per gallon by Pimental in 2001. Yet another study estimated
the energy balance at 30,589 BTUs per gallon (Lorez, 1995). The results from these
specific studies roughly represent the outcome from other related studies.
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A study aimed at establishing the true Net Energy Value (NEV) of ethanol in
2002 indicates that discrepancies between the studies are probably a result of using
“various assumptions about farm production and ethanol conversion (USDA, 2002).”
Furthermore, USDA notes that previous research may have been done using different
data from changing time periods. In the same study, USDA attempts to address each of
these issues and accurately estimate the NEV of ethanol. The result was a positive NEV
of 21,105 BTUs per gallon of ethanol.
What sets the USDA study apart from others is the use of an expansive dataset for
their calculations which is compiled from the nine highest corn and ethanol producing
states. Their methods employ weighted and moving averages throughout. In contrast, the
other studies generally use data from specific locations and a specific set of localized
criteria for corn and ethanol production. While the USDA study considered the factors
which create the variability between studies, the individual estimates may be more
accurate for estimating NEV in individual localities and production chains.
Therefore, it may be implicitly inaccurate to state whether or not corn ethanol
exhibits a positive NEV based on a given set of assumptions. Where NEV is critical to
the argument of whether or not corn ethanol contributes to domestic energy security, the
only way to answer this point is to take a national accounting of ethanol production thus
far and estimate what the NEV of current and past ethanol production is. Only then can
we truly know if dependence oil-based fuels has been reduced and to what extent.
A critical point regarding the energy security contributed by corn ethanol is that
of the potential for corn to displace current and expected fuel consumption of traditional
fuels. A popular way of assailing this case is to describe how much ethanol could be
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produced if every acre in the U.S. was dedicated to corn production. A more realistic
perspective may be to estimate the amount of ethanol which could be produced from
current corn yields since these are at all time historic highs.
In 2008, the United States corn crop amounted to 12.02 billion bushels (NASS,
2009), a drop of over 7% from 2007. Using the most recent and highest conversion rate
of 2.7 gallons per bushel (www.ethanolmarket.com) there is a potential production of
33.66 billion gallons of ethanol from 12 billion bushels of corn. In 2007 the U.S.
consumed over 140 billion gallons of gasoline (EIA, 2009). If all of the potential ethanol
were blended into gasoline, roughly 24% of gasoline consumed today would be
displaced. However, this notion is wholly unrealistic. It is based on the assumption that
the entire U.S. corn crop at current levels would be devoted to ethanol production at the
expense of all other domestic demand. The RFS also does not stipulate that in the future
all ethanol should be derived from corn. The mandate is that a maximum of 15 billion
gallons be converted from corn when the RFS matures. Even if the conversion ration
were improved to 3 gallons per bushel, it will still require 5 billion bushels of corn to
meet which would represent about 38% of the corn crop in the record crop marketing
year 2007 (NASS, 2009). These levels would be equivalent to about 12% of domestic
gasoline consumption being displaced by a domestic source of energy.
But if we return to the idea of an NEV for ethanol, this amount of energy security
achieved is vague at best. The best USDA estimate of an energy ratio for a dry milling
operation is 1.11 for corn to ethanol conversion. This would imply that a mere 11% net
benefit is realized in terms of energy from ethanol due to the energy inputs required to
make it. From a 15 billion gallon production level, we can then infer that nearly 13.5
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billion gallon equivalents of energy were used to produce the alternative, leaving a net
displacement of the energy equivalent to 1.5 billion gallons of ethanol. Adjusting the total
impact on energy security, we arrive at a 1.05% reduction of dependence on energy from
sources other than ethanol (i.e. crude oil products, etc.) while at the same time nearly
doubling the energy consumption in pursuit of corn ethanol. Appropriately, Carriquiry,
Hayes and Rubin (2008), show that energy security is more efficiently attained by
investing in an alternative such as green coal technology.
Environmental Impacts
In contrast to the issue of net energy balance, there seems to be some agreement
on the GHG emissions of ethanol when used as transportation fuel. In a life-cycle
analysis, ethanol production and combustion may reduce GHG by as much of 88%
compared to the energy equivalent of gasoline (Hill et al., 2006). Measuring directly,
Wang (2005) reports that ethanol blends of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline (E85) emit up
to 23% less GHG than pure gasoline in flex-fuel vehicles. Furthermore, the more
common blend of E10 was reported to emit up to 2% less GHG than regular gasoline.
However, the GHG considerations extend beyond ethanol as a fuel. The
production of ethanol seems to increase GHG overall due to land use changes. Babcock,
Feng and Rubin (2008) show a 35% increase in GHG emissions from corn production
when cropland is used to grow successive corn crops. Typically, corn is grown in rotation
with soybeans, reducing the need for additional fertilizer applications. But most of the
expanded corn crop is being produced in succession on cultivated lands (Babcock, 2008).
In addition, although proper cultivation practices can aid in sequestering GHG from the
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atmosphere into the soil (Hill, 2006) poor production practices can actually lead to the
release of additional GHG into the atmosphere (Brenner et al., 2001).
When evaluating the environmental impact of ethanol beyond GHG emissions,
the effects are complex and extensive. In a working paper commissioned by The World
Bank, it is pointed out that biofuel-related impacts on the environment include issues
such as increased soil erosion, reduced water quality, increased resource diversion and
chemical contamination from expanded use of pesticides and herbicides (Rajagopal and
Zilberman, 2007).
For example, Beckman, et.al. (2008) performed research on future land-use
changes as a result of broad biofuel mandates. They predicted that by the year 2015 there
would be a 9.8% increase in land used for corn production in the United States alone. A
prediction of a 10.0% decrease in land used for production of other grains may imply a
“shifting” of these crops to corn, but two practical issues arise. First, the major grain corn
growing centers are agronomically distinct from the major growing centers of other
grains. In the United States corn is grown in areas where it can be economically rotated
with soybean production. But this same model actually predicts an increase in oilseed
production generally. Secondly, the number of acres on which corn is grown in the
United States represented approximately 33% of all cultivated land in 2005. This is
compared to nearly 27% for wheat, barley and oats combined (ERS, 2008). The
Beckman, et.al., study was done in 2008 at a time when corn acres had already been
expanded by 6.3% to 87.3 million acres since 2005.
This debate regarding the concept of land-use change has also now entered the
public arena. On March 5, 2009, the California Environmental Protection Agency
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(CEPA) Air Resources Board released a set of proposed legislation to implement
California’s “low carbon standard.” In that document, ethanol from corn is actually
tagged as releasing more CO2 than conventional gasoline. For every mega-joule of
energy which gasoline releases, approximately 95 grams of carbon-dioxide is emitted.
But in the case of corn ethanol, 69 grams are emitted from direct ethanol production, and
an additional 30 grams from supposed land-use change (CEPA, 2009). At the time of this
writing, there is also considerable debate taking place between the USDA and the EPA.
The USDA would like to see the blending floor raised for refiners but the EPA is
delaying a ruling on that issue to further explore the ideas of land-use change and the
merits of life-cycle analysis (EPA, 2009).
Although one bushel of corn will yield 2.7 gallons of ethanol, it requires
anywhere from four to eight gallons of water to produce (Broz, 2008). Therefore, the
rapid expansion of ethanol processing plants is contributing to the pressure on an already
strained water supply. Concerns have been raised regarding the sustainability of local
aquifers facing this additional withdrawal of water (Pimental, 2003; O’Brien, 2008;
Higgins, Outlaw and Richardson 2008).
The attempts of current research to estimate the far-reaching environmental
impacts of ethanol are limited. Pimental (p130) summarizes the data by stating:
“…corn production uses more herbicides and insecticides than any other
crop produced in the U.S. thereby causing more water pollution than any
other crop. Further, corn production uses more nitrogen fertilizer than any
crop produced and therefore is a major contributor to ground water and
river water pollution.”
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At the time of this review, no quantitative analysis could be found which
measured these impacts resulting from the expanded corn production. However, the claim
necessitates further investigation into the degree to which ethanol production impacts the
environment. It is too narrow an argument to focus on the life-cycle GHG emissions of
ethanol fuel compared to gasoline. Indeed, expanding corn production, increasing the
intensity to which agricultural land is farmed and the ethanol production processes
themselves have wide environmental implications.
Economic Impacts
As more ethanol plants are built and the production capacity of the industry is
expanded, local economies are impacted. New jobs are created, inputs are purchased and
investments are made. There may be more literature available regarding the economic
impacts of ethanol production than any other individual topic. Ethanol plants are
purported to be large employers, use large amounts of energy, contribute to the local tax
base, utilize government subsidies and purchase large amounts of inputs from local
suppliers. The economic impact of ethanol production should be large locally if not
nationally as well.
The general public has implicitly taken an interest in ethanol supply and use.
Through the VEETC, import tariffs and loan guarantees, that interest is materialized into
the financial realms. Overall, Koplow estimated that government support for ethanol
topped $5.1 billion in 2006. This included all support activities related to then-current
ethanol production including feedstock producer support, capital development, blending,
etc. Urbanchuk estimated that direct support for ethanol production and consumption,
through the volumetric excise tax credit and the small producer subsidy, totaled $3.4
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billion in 2007. This excludes the indirect subsidization of capital financing and
feedstock supplies included in the Koplow study. Other estimates are higher as noted
earlier in this paper. In contrast, the ethanol industry generated more than $4.6 billion in
taxes for the federal government. Therefore, disregarding the indirect support of ethanol
production, the industry produced a net surplus to the public coffers (Urbanchek, 2008).
At the micro-economic level, it is impractical to estimate the cumulative effects of
all ethanol production. However, it is useful to estimate the impacts a new or existing
plant might have on local economic activity. Generally, the studies which have estimated
local economic impacts of ethanol plants have used input-output modeling programs such
as IMPLAN for their analysis. These programs are capable of estimating the relative
changes in employment, tax revenues and total business product for a defined economic
region. They are especially useful because they analyze direct, indirect and induced
effects of economic changes through multipliers.
Capital expenditures for new plants are substantial. Flanders et. al. (2007)
estimated the costs for a 100 MGY facility in Georgia to be over $170 million. The same
research indicated annual net returns of over $59 million. The total economic
contribution to the state would be $314.2 million and all tax revenue through the state
level would accrue a total of $4.572 million. In the study by Isserman and Low (2008)
total revenues for a comparable plant were $203 million and $121 million for a smaller
60 MGY capacity plant. Wage creation for the Isserman and Low (2008) study were $2.4
million for an estimated 35 direct full-time equivalent employees.
The average ethanol plant capacity is currently around 64 million gallons per year
(RFA, 2008). The largest of these has a capacity of approximately 115 MGY while the
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smallest is around 5 MGY. Most of the studies done to estimate the local economic
impacts of plants make the assumption of a 50-60 MGY plant, 100 MGY plant or a
combination of the two. Most of the studies have similar results. Over half of ethanol
plants employ between 20 and 49 workers (Isserman and Low, 2008). Swenson (2008)
used a 41 MGY year plant in his study and found that 135 new jobs were created from an
ethanol plant built in 2003. Flanders et. al. (2007) estimated 408 new jobs resulting from
a newly constructed 100MGY plant. Isserman and Low (2008) estimate that for a
100MGY plant, new job creation ranges from 152 to 248 in various counties. One of the
most comprehensive studies found which measured job creation was Leatherman,
Peterson and Schlosser (2008). They cite the Minnesota Department of Agriculture as
estimating a total of 154 direct jobs created from 4 new facilities and 2,784 jobs
altogether. The research also concludes that predicting the impacts in the future,
especially with respect to jobs, is “risky and uncertain.” In any case, most of the
predictions have fallen in line with each other and seem to be accurate over time.
Typically, ethanol plants are built in the most rural portions of the United States.
The reason for this is because the most expensive input for these plants, corn grain,
becomes quite expensive to transport much further than 100 miles away (Isserman and
Low, 2008). In fact one of the most important economic impacts of the ethanol mandates
is related to transportation. After feedstock and energy costs, freight is the next highest
cost to an ethanol facility (Flanders, et. al., 2007). In one county from the Isserman and
Low (2008) analysis, 250 jobs were created from all effects in the input-output model,
including direct, indirect and induced effects. Of these, 57 were created in the
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transportation sector. This is presumably from the increased freight delivery of grain to
the plants and additional transport of ethanol to customers outside of the region.
The expansion of corn production has also increased the demand for suitable land
on which to grow crops. The increased demand has in turn bid up rental rates on viable
cropland. Using a Ricardian rent theory, Du, Edwards and Hennessy (2008) found no
significant impact on rental rates resulting from ethanol expansion. However, data from
Illinois Society of Professional Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers shows cash rents
increased 10 % from 2006-2007 and between 10% and 20% the following year
(ISPFMRA, 2007). The same data indicated a premium on acres which were closer to
ethanol plants.
Whether due to higher land values or increased local grain demand, Schill (2007)
also reported an increase in crop prices. This is consistent with the laws of supply and
demand considering that corn producers have additional marketing choices when ethanol
plants open in their area. This is supported by Babcock and Feng (2008) which
demonstrated a “trickling down” effect on prices for other related crops. They said that as
land allocation shifted in response to higher corn prices, soybean and other grain prices
were also stimulated.
Certainly the effects of job creation, capital investment, tax generation, plant
revenues, rental rates and crop prices are significant. And if one considers these
individual effects for each plant multiplied for all plants across the country, the ethanol
industry is measurably making an impact on the national economy.
Thus far we have discussed the various aspects of corn ethanol most often
cited by ethanol advocates. With respect to energy issues and the potential for ethanol to
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contribute to domestic energy security, I have shown that the potential is limited given
the NEV as calculated by current research. In essence, fossil fuels which are mostly
foreign sourced are still consumed to produce ethanol. Environmental impacts resulting
from ethanol production are vague at best. While ethanol fuel has lower GHG emissions
than convention gasoline, expansion of the corn supply and ethanol industry induces a
number of collateral environmental effects which may more than offset the GHG
reductions by using ethanol as a substitute for gasoline. Further research should aim to
document these environmental changes in quantitative ways in order to be inclusive in
environmental analysis. Finally, I have shown that diverting a substantial share of the
U.S. corn crop into ethanol production does drive a sizeable economic footprint. Federal
tax revenue likely outpaces subsidies, new jobs are created and multiplied impacts
contribute greatly to local, regional and the national economies. I have not yet addressed
the issue of reduced consumer energy prices or whether or not farm income has been
stimulated. These points will be visited later in a discussion about creating a new
artificial demand through the RFS and how farm prices are now inextricably linked to
energy.
Arguments Against Ethanol
In the case of corn producers, ethanol is naturally a desired market in which to
sell the crop. It opens up a large market channel for value-added products and thereby
decreases the price-taking anomaly which farmers face. In turn, the new demand for corn
as an input for ethanol may drive corn prices higher which should benefit farmers. On the
other hand, higher corn and grain prices in general adversely affect the livestock industry
and even ethanol producing firms. The livestock industry often claims that since the
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introduction of the RFS, already slim profit margins have shrunk and increased market
volatility has made business activities more difficult. Ethical complications have also
arisen lately as consumers claim that ethanol has caused an artificial price bubble. The
historic price levels have far-reaching implications for food consumers around the world.
This is the common “food vs. fuel” debate which is rarely explored very comprehensively
but has ethical implications tied to it. One final argument set forth against ethanol is that
without subsidies, it is not a viable industry. Therefore the large capital costs and
investments in plants, infrastructure, etc. are “sunk” costs. Opponents of ethanol also
dispute the benefits of ethanol fuel but this discussion was had previously.
Impacts on the Livestock Industry
Before EISA 2007 increased the RFS defined mandates from previous legislation,
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association sent a letter to congress on behalf of beef
producers in the United States. Their position was as follows (Truitt, 2007):
Due to the incredible expansion that has recently taken place within the
corn-based ethanol industry, ranchers and cattle feeders are expanding
their use of alternative feedstuffs, and doing their best to respond to the
rapidly changing marketplace. However, corn is and will remain an
essential input for their business. Mandating additional corn ethanol
production will only serve to exacerbate an already difficult situation for
cattle producers across the country.
At the time of this letter, Corn prices had already increased by over 100% since three
years prior (ERS, 2009). Indeed NCBA fears were confirmed after EISA 2007 was
signed into law as prices peaked 87% higher eleven months later.
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The nature of beef markets in the U.S. is a key to understanding the position of
NCBA. Most cattle destined for meat production are placed into a feedlot where 85% of
feed rations are typically energy intensive feedstuffs like grain corn (NCBA, 2009). The
traditional reason for this is the abundant surpluses of corn which have been produced in
the United States since the 1950s. Corn has been relatively cheap compared to other feed
components and this is what gave rise to grain feeding cattle.
But cattle are not the only livestock species dependent on corn and other grains in
their production processes. The National Pork Producer’s Council (NPPC) takes the
position that ethanol impacts will settle in the long-term but the short term implications
jeopardize the industry’s competitiveness (NPPC, 2009). In a letter similar to the
NCBA’s, the National Chicken Council (NCC) told the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that “the Renewable Fuel Standard has distorted the market and has
imposed severe economic harm on companies in our industry through dramatically higher
input costs and is imposing harm on the general public in the form of higher prices,
present or impending, for food products (NCC, 2008).” The NCC represents roughly 95%
of broiler producers in the country.
Similar to the environmental impacts, many of the impacts ethanol has had on the
livestock industry were unforeseen and heretofore minimally assessed. Most of the
research attempting to objectively measure these notions tends to support the statements
made by these three organizations.
The problems which the livestock industry faces as a result of ethanol are rooted
in the basic principles of supply and demand economics. By explicitly mandating the
supply of corn ethanol, the RFS implicitly creates an artificial demand for the feedstock.
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Ceteris paribus, if the corn market is in equilibrium, this new demand would exhaust
supplies and the price of corn would invariably increase. The rate at which it would
increase would only be limited by its own price elasticity of demand. Rosegrant (2008)
agreed in a testimony to lawmakers regarding the sharp increase in food prices. He also
indicated that in addition to the strain on commodity supplies, new competition is
introduced to produce corn. Several simultaneous factors have also influenced
commodity prices in recent years. Global weather conditions, developing economies and
declining stocks have all contributed to the inflation. The proportional influence of each
of these factors is difficult to measure and is often compared to growing global demand
for biofuels (Rosegrant, 2008).
But the livestock industry may be right to tag ethanol as the primary culprit
behind rising commodity prices for two reasons: 1. The other factors are exogenously
controlled while ethanol is an optional enterprise artificially imposed by the U.S.
government, and, 2. A growing share of the corn crop is diverted to ethanol production.
The portion of the corn crop diverted away from available supplies is substantial as
shown by Figure 2. Before 2002, corn used for ethanol increased but never exceeded 7%
of the current year’s production. Since 2002, the rate at which corn has been diverted into
ethanol has accelerated (NCGA, 2008). In 2006, the year following the first RFS, the
portion of the corn crop used for ethanol jumped from 14% to 20%. In 2008, roughly
31% of 12.1 billion bushels was consumed by the ethanol industry (ERS, 2009).
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Figure 2. Share of Corn Crop Used for Ethanol

2007 RFS
2005 RFS
2002 Farm Bill

Source: Economic Research Service

The corn industry may say that this dramatic shift has essentially not adversely
affected corn supplies because the annual corn crop has expanded to meet the ethanol
demand for corn. A record 13.37 billion bushels was produced in 2007 (ERS, 2008) and
despite a smaller crop in 2008, the remaining amount of corn has remained stable. The
corn left after ethanol has remained steady at around 8.7 billion bushels (FAS, 2009).
Therefore, the ethanol industry is simply “skimming the cream” off the top and not
affecting corn price. On the other hand, beginning stocks have been declining since 2004
(FAS, 2009) and are approaching historic lows. This combined with a growing global
demand for grains may actually be the true driver behind grain prices.
The reason for this is the price discovery mechanism used for setting price levels
of commodities in the U.S. and subsequently in the world. Prices for commodities are
determined in futures trading centers where contracts for future delivery are bought and
sold. The price levels are determined by a number of commercial and non-commercial
participants buying and selling in large part based on future expectations. Generally,
39

prices paid to farmers are based on these markets and adjusted for a transportation basis.
If future expectations of grain supplies relative to demand are waning, and this due to a
rapidly growing ethanol sector and declining worldwide stocks, then speculation about
the trends might contribute to rapid price increases. One of the purposes of this
manuscript is to explore the extent to which these markets drive price discovery, but the
livestock industry may be right in pointing to ethanol as a primary cause for the increase
in commodity prices. This will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5.
Yet even with all the gross diversion of acres and corn grain to the ethanol
industry, the loss is not complete. Recall in chapter 1 the discussion regarding ethanol
production. In both wet and dry milling, ethanol production generates byproducts. One of
the main byproducts from dry milling, which accounts for 95% of all ethanol plants and
nearly all new ethanol facilities, is Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles (DDGS).
Of each 56 pound bushel of corn used for ethanol, roughly 17.4 pound is
recovered in the form of DDGS (Baker and Zahniser, 2006). While it is not a perfect
substitute for corn in livestock rations, it is highly sought after in ruminant feed
(University of Minnesota, 2008). Nutritional analysis shows that DDGS has 91% of the
digestible energy value of corn, which is the property desired by corn feeding. It is also
high in protein, vitamins and is highly palatable to beef cattle (Kansas Ethanol, 2008).
Approximately 80% of DDGS sold for feed are consumed by cattle (University of
Minnesota, 2008). This is due to the fact that cattle are best suited to consume DDGS
considering its low starch and high fiber contents (Babcock and Clemens, 2008). But
there is a growing demand in the swine industry which has begun to feed DDGS at a rate
of 10% in pig diets (Noll and Shurson, 2005). DDGS in swine rations is acceptable up to
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20% of dry matter (Fabiosa, 2008). The poultry industry has also begun to include DDGS
in broiler rations and is acceptable up to 10% of dry matter (Noll and Shurson, 2005).
The biggest obstacle for poultry to use DDGS in rations is the concentrated level of fiber
from the ethanol milling process (Maddy et. al., 2008).
Economically, it is vital to understand that the consensus indicates no
deterioration of carcass quality for cattle fed DDGS (Babcock et. al., 2008; Kansas
Ethanol; Maddy et. al., 2008). Therefore, cattle producers and feeders should not be
concerned about a loss in quality when substituting DDGS for some other feed
component. In addition, there may be evidence that switching to DDGS in rations may
have economic benefits to livestock producers. Tonsor (2006) performed an analysis
which indicated hog production would benefit from DDGS inclusion. Other such studies
support the idea that a cost savings is realized when switching to DDGS in light of the
higher corn prices (Lawrence, 2006). The economics results for feeding DDGS to cattle
are mixed. Lawrence (2006) indicates that the profitability of switching to DDGS
depends on the ration inclusion rate and the weight of cattle at which they are started on
DDGS. Daley (2007) performed research which indicated feed costs would be reduced by
DDGS. But Babcock et. al. (2007) contends that the rapid loss of corn supply shifts to an
increase demand for DDGS to such a degree that DDGS prices track corn prices. Their
study states that it will happen to such a degree that producers will shift back to corn and
soy based rations which had previously been deferred for cheaper DDGS (Babcock et. al.,
2007). In the same study, Babcock et. al. predicts that commodity price shocks resulting
from ethanol are permanent, and cattle production will have adjust or beef prices will rise
to reflect the increased costs of production.

41

Efforts to research the economic and nutritional benefits of DDGS as a feed are
growing. It would appear that the nutritional characteristics are indisputably beneficial to
cattle and DDGS is highly valuable as a livestock feed, especially in cattle. However, the
economic tradeoffs between feeding corn and DDGS at equal prices are uncertain and
should be explored further. Regardless of the substitutability of DDGS for corn, the
ethanol mandate has fueled rising commodity prices and adversely affects the livestock
industry. The extent to which this has occurred is ambiguous, but livestock production
will have to adjust to a changing market structure.
Impacts on Other Grain Markets
Perhaps a more dramatic effect which ethanol has made is that on other grain
markets. When discussing the impacts ethanol has on the livestock industry, we really
approach the issue from an issue of cost changes from a new demand sector competing
for the same input – livestock and ethanol producers competing for corn. But this
dramatic change to the profile of corn demand has also put pressure on the supply side.
In 2006, Elobeid et al. performed a study to analyze the impacts of the thencurrent RFS (as stipulated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005) on external markets. The
first measure of the study was that the breakeven price for corn would reach $4.05 per
bushel in order to be sufficiently high enough to entice farmers to grow enough corn to
satisfy the projected ethanol production. Corn ethanol production would expand to 31.5
billion gallons by 2015 and a plethora of other effects would take place. Under the
defined assumptions of the study, corn production would expand mostly at the expense of
soybean acres. Additionally, demand for feed wheat would increase as a substitute for the
diverted corn, putting added strain on wheat markets around the world. Therefore, wheat
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exports would fall along with corn exports and pork and poultry production (Elobeid,
2006).
The study is careful to point out that its precise measures should not be considered
actual predictions of statistical adjustments. But the study is very useful in thinking
through the scenario by which outside grain markets are affected. Because arable land in
the U.S. is finite, we should consider what acreage shifts would occur as a result of
increased corn demand. It also makes sense that wheat as an inferior feed product,
implied by the apparent preference for corn, would find demand-side support from the
livestock industry. Considering the idea that in many parts of the country corn is often
cultivated in rotation with soybean crops, it also makes sense that additional corn demand
will decrease the incentive to plant soybeans. In a previous section, the effect this would
have on land fertility was examined and should be noted. Raising corn after corn in the
same plot of land deteriorates the yields made possible by the resident soil.
These are only specific effects which would inherently be observed by tracking
the consequences of the RFS. But it actually presents an example of a very simple
economic principle. Resources are limited and must be rationed. A valid question is who
should be the steward in deciding how to ration those resources and how do we justify
their impacts throughout the general economy.
In July 2007, before the expanded RFS was signed into law later that year,
Babcock, et al. updated and improved upon the 2006 study by Elobeid, et al. Their
models used more tempered the assumptions and produced measures of ethanol impacts
which I will review here. In the first place, they projected corn ethanol production to
increase to 14.77 billion gallons by 2011. In order for the industry to sustain this
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production, corn acres would have to increase to 94 million and average prices would
have to be at $3.40 per bushel. Following these estimates, the livestock sector decreases
production, exports decline and commodity prices increase. But the most interesting
insight from their study is an analysis of the exposure to risk of an unforeseen event such
as a major drought. Babcock, et al. (2007) showed that in case of a major sudden strain
on supplies, that ethanol plants would operate until the price of corn was too high to
operate a margin. But they point out that the result in the case where ethanol was
operating under a mandate, the adjustments would take place externally to ethanol.
Livestock and export markets would invariable be faced with the prospect of being forced
out of competition for the available commodity supplies.
The literature which discusses the consequences imposed on outside grain
markets as a result of corn ethanol is limited. This is one of the primary questions I seek
to address in the following chapter. However, as opposed to projecting the effects of corn
ethanol into the future, I will show what implied effects have already taken place as it
correlates to the expansion of the ethanol industry.
Food Vs. Fuel
There are also ethical ramifications for analyzing current U.S. biofuel policy.
While some consider the environmental side of ethanol to be an ethical issue, a far more
serious issue is the criticism that it violates societal morals to use food to produce fuel.
Many group studies have begun to emerge which point to the ethical violation of
producing biofuels before helping to feed the developing nations of the world. Those who
subscribe to this criticism claim that biofuels have caused food price inflation making it
more difficult for poorer nations to afford food products. They also say that those
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precious resources used to produce food - such as seed, commodities, credit and capital –
should go directly to satisfy hungry populations.
Both the Farm Foundation (2008) and Babcock, et al.(2007) cite biofuels as a
concern for food production. They both assign some causality to biofuels for rising food
costs. The subject they really bring into perspective is that in a world where population
growth is inevitable and accelerating, food demand is at an all time high. They also point
to flat-lining world food production and ever-tightening global food stocks. For example,
in six out of the last eight years, wheat consumption has outstripped wheat production
(FAS, 2009; ERS, 2009). And while it may be difficult to blame biofuels for reduced
global wheat production, it begs the question as to what we will produce and for which
demand. In chapter 4 I will explore this idea of whether or not ethanol has diverted
resources away from wheat production.
The food vs. fuel debate is difficult to argue because the supporting data is vague.
It also is so complex, that econometric analysis will produce mixed results at best. What
is important is to raise the idea of a fuel vs. food war when considering the law of
unintended consequences. After all, this paper is exploring the unintended consequences
of creating the RFS, which was designed to address climate change, energy independence
and rural prosperity.
Linking Agriculture to Energy
Thus far I have discussed the merits of ethanol and the relative economic impacts
of imposing the RFS onto the transportation fuel sector. But these changes and impacts
are only the direct effects of the current biofuels policies. The more direct impact of the
RFS is a structural change in the way which agricultural markets behave to exogenous
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factors. Before 2005, the energy industry and policies were distinctly separate from
agriculture. The extent to which the two markets were linked was limited by the cost of
fuel and fertilizers as inputs for farm production and perhaps competition for capital
resources. But beyond this, the two industries have not typically competed over land use
or entry to consumer markets. Prices for these sectors’ respective goods were discovered
in separate marketplaces and the factors which affected their trade were unique. Today,
current literature shows a new and exceptional linkage between two fundamentally
different markets.
Figure 3 illustrates the linkage between corn price and crude oil. It is apparent that
before 2005, the prices of each commodity moved independent of each other. But, since
that same year, corn price has moved in a pattern very consistent with crude oil.
Figure 3. Monthly Oil and corn Price.

2007 RFS
2005 RFS

2002 Farm Bill

Source: Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy; Economic Research Service, USDA
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This has been documented by numerous researchers. Taheripour and Tyner
(2008) report that the correlation coefficient between corn and crude oil from 1982 –
2007 is roughly .16. In the same study, they show that the correlations between crude and
other energy products such as gasoline and ethanol range from .86 to .98. This is logical
and the differences would be expected when calculating the correlation between distinct
markets. As another example, the same study shows a .72 correlation coefficient for the
corn and soybean complex. But since corn has become a major input in energy markets
via ethanol, this has changed. Consider the fact that in 2000, about 604 million bushels
were used to produce 1.63 billion gallons of corn ethanol. At the time, this represented
6.1% of the total U.S. corn crop. By 2008 the portion of the corn crop going to produce
corn ethanol was nearly 25% of an historically large corn supply. If energy now
represents one-quarter of all U.S. corn demand, we should certainly see a measurably
increased correlation between the two sectors of the economy.
Ethanol Producer Magazine (2008), an industry publication, reports that the
correlation between crude and corn now stands at 75% since 2007, up from their own
estimate of 65% since 2003. Other reports are more staggering. In a publication by the
Kansas Farm Bureau in June 2008, linear regression modeling was used to estimate the
R-squared coefficient for several commodities and crude oil. Their approach was to
analyze the impact which a rise in crude oil price now has on variable costs of production
per acre for dryland and irrigated corn, grain sorghum, wheat and soybeans. They
concluded that all variable costs were highly sensitive to a change in crude oil price. For
data ranging from 1992 to 2007, they show that costs of production for dryland corn and
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irrigated corn rise by $1.02 and $0.56 respectively. In addition, they report that the
correlation for these costs to crude oil are .88 for dryland corn and .93 for irrigated corn.
Mitchell (as cited in Delgado, 2009) shows that since oil has been above $50 per
barrel of crude, that the R-square with corn price has been .75. He also shows a less
impressive correlation of .52 when crude is below $50 per barrel, but this only
substantiates the reports earlier cited because crude has not been below $50 since 2005
when the first version of the RFS was signed into law. In the same year, corn used for
ethanol had not yet exceeded 12% of the domestic corn supply.
Commodity Futures Markets
As stated in the introductory chapter, one of the primary purposes of this thesis is
to explore what effect the introduction of the RFS has had on agricultural markets. One of
the main centers of activity within the agricultural sector are the futures markets. These
are more commonly referred to as Board’s of Trade (BOT), but are the center of activities
revolving around the trading of futures contracts for delivery of commodities at a later
date.
The various BOTs are used as points of price discovery in the agricultural
community. Commodity suppliers, user’s, brokers and processors alike utilize these
center to find relative values for their commodities and to manage the risks associated
with price fluctuations in the future (CFTC, 2008). A detailed explanation of how futures
markets are utilized and the mechanics thereof is not presented here, but the reader may
find myriad material reviewing the concepts relating to them, such as Koontz and Purcell
(1999).
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As a background, speculators play a vital role in the futures market. Their most
cited benefit is that they bring added liquidity to futures trading. They voluntarily enter
futures trading for the chance at arbitraging profits while taking on risk the other
participants would not. They provide an immediate buyer to a seller of futures contracts
and/or act as an immediate seller of contracts when a buyer is present. There is little
dispute as to the benefits of having these additional market participants.
A topic of recent interest affecting the stakeholders of these trading centers is the
effectiveness to accomplish their purpose which is described by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). Many have questioned the ability of futures markets to not
only discover commodity values, but whether or not the ability to assist in risk
management has been diminished since the introduction of the RFS. There have been
many claims regarding increased volatility and lack of price convergence at the
expiration of contracts. Many BOT participants have claimed that speculation in the
futures markets has led to this problematic pricing action in the futures markets.
Since 2005, historical and implied volatilities for world commodities have
reached unprecedented levels (FAO, 2008). Bange (2008) supports this calculation and
attributes part of the volatility to linking agriculture to energy markets and the accelerated
production of biofuels in the U.S. and abroad. Others within industry circles have
assigned blame for the volatility to increased speculation in the marketplace (Seeking
Alpha, 2009). But the Government Accountability Office (2009) released a publication in
which eight empirical studies were reviewed. GAO concluded that none of these studies
found significant statistical evidence which pointed to speculation as a cause of the
recently increased price volatility in agricultural markets. Furthermore, a study done on
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behalf of various BOTs by Informa Economics (2008) makes a pointed insight. The study
points out the difiiculty in assigning causality between speculation and volatility as the
one may attract the other. Speculators are often drawn to volatile markets where arbitrage
may take place and conversely, the increased participation in a market may contribute to
grater price swings from period to period.
The same research by Informa and other studies (Irwin, Merrin and Sanders,
2008) have found that the market participation rates have changed in recent years. Nearly
all the studies reviewed used some version of the Commitment of Traders report put forth
by the CFTC. The data in this report which is released to the public is a weekly sample of
the full dataset which is considered private. The report details the participation of groups
distinguished as large traders and classified as either commercial or non-commercial. It
tracks each segment’s ownership of open interest in the futures markets. It further
categorizes the non-commercial into various groups such as indexers, money managers
and general non commercial participants. All of these groups are considered speculators.
Irwin, Merrin and Sanders (2008) measured two time period in the COT dataset,
the first ranging from 1995 through 2005 and the second covering 2005 through 2008.
They found that between the two periods, open interest held by non-commercial
participants (speculators) increased from 28% to 39%. The commercially-held open
interest remained relatively steady at 46-47%. Interestingly, the non-reporting segment
(which consists of traders who trade a small enough volume to be exempt from the
reporting process) showed a decrease from 25% to 15%. This would lend credit to the
idea that most of this participation change may have resulted as a result of this nonreporting group trading substantial volume so as to lose exemption from the reporting
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criteria. Informa also contributed yet another useful insight to the trader participation. It
essentially showed that while the participation rates may have changed, the relative
behavior of each group throughout the life of a futures contract did not. Overall, both
studies recorded sizeable increases in volume of open interest which will be evaluated by
this paper as well in chapter 4.
The role which the RFS has played in the futures markets is difficult to quantify.
In the following chapter, I will present my theoretical approach on what might be
expected by introducing such a large artificial demand for agricultural commodities. It
may be summed up by the idea that when such a shock takes place in any market, there
must be an initial period where the long known equilibrium is lost and must re-adjust.
Where the futures markets are the central point in which price discovery takes place,
these centers must invariably be the first to adjust and at times in the most unprecedented
ways.
Conclusion
The issues related to ethanol and the effects of the RFS are so broad in scope that
many researchers have conceded that it would be difficult to truly quantify the effects of
U.S. biofuel policy. What is certain, however, is that the RFS and the sheer scale on
which ethanol is currently being produced, and that which will be produced in the future,
has lasting ramifications for agriculture and energy markets, as well as environmental and
social clusters. It would be difficult to objectively measure each of the unique facets of
ethanol production in one single paper.
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Chapter 4 – Theoretical Discussion, Methods of Analysis, and Data
Economic Theory
Thus far the issues which surround the introduction of corn ethanol as a major
substitution for transportation fuel in the United States have been examined. The RFS
essentially creates a new demand for ethanol and stipulates the volume as well. But as far
as the market structure is concerned, how should we expect the forces of supply and
demand to interact? More specifically, what will happen to the commodity markets as
this new demand places increased pressure on corn supplies and raises the level of
competition for inputs? What will be the response by suppliers and what should that
mean for market participants? These questions will be the subject of this chapter.
I emphasize again that the RFS does not mandate ethanol production. Rather, it
creates a blending floor – the minimum amount of ethanol which a blender must mix into
the gasoline supply from year to year. It also stipulates that by 2022, 15 billion gallons of
the total 36 outlined in the RFS must come from corn-ethanol. Therefore, it is essentially
a mandated purchase of ethanol produced from corn. This purchase of corn ethanol
inevitably translates into purchases of corn. The corn purchase raises the first economic
issue of derived demand.
The first laws of supply and demand are simple. The economic community
universally recognizes that as supply increases, so does downward pressure on prices,
ceteris paribus. If supply decreases, prices will increase ceteris paribus. Conversely, if
demand increases price will follow by increasing as well. If demand decreases, there is a
relative oversupply of goods and therefore prices will fall.
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When the U.S government introduced and implemented the RFS, they essentially
created an indirect demand for a proportional quantity of corn. It is reasonable to apply
the assumption that the demand for corn is proportional for two reasons: 1) The
conversion efficiency of corn to ethanol has basically flat-lined at 2.7 gallons of ethanol
per bushel of corn, and 2) The RFS defines fixed minimum blending amounts for
refiners. For example, in 2015, the RFS commands that 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol
be used in the national transportation supply. Therefore, this also mandates the use of
approximately 5.55 billion bushels of corn. Unless, the conversion ratio improves
considerably, this is a direct and proportional level of corn use, tied to the RFS.
In that case, assuming no other demand factors change, the effects of the RFS on
supply and demand can be illustrated through the charts in Figures 4. The changes can be
summarized in three basic events or periods. The first event will be an initial shock to the
demand profile for corn. This will result in the demand curve shifting outward, causing
price to increase substantially and generating real economic profit to corn producers. The
second period will mainly be a period of price discovery. This will include incremental
adjustments in supply, demand and long run average costs and prices will be quite
volatile as the market searches for a new equilibrium price. Finally, as supply adjusts to
meet demand at the minimum long run average cost, equilibrium price will be discovered
at a level greater than the preceding period. In the long-run, industry profits will fall
again to zero and the market as a whole will face the fundamental challenges inherent to
agriculture, such as the technological treadmill. An important assumption to this analysis
is that the change in demand is a one-time event in slight contrast to the ongoing
expansion of the RFS. The perspective will be that from the final results of the maximum
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Figure 4. Theoretical Changes in Supply, Demand and Costs.
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defined amount of corn based ethanol in the RFS, i.e. in 2015 and beyond. In stating this
assumption, it would be plausible for these changes to occur periodically, each time the
RFS is adjusted. However, the net effect will be the same, although the short-run impacts
will be drawn out over a longer period. The assumption is also made that aside from the
RFS, normal growth or contraction (as affected by continuous economic conditions) will
occur in the other corn-demand centers. A more detailed explanation of each period now
follows.
Period 1
I have already described how the RFS defines a direct quantity of corn usage. The
net effect of this action is an outward shift in the demand curve shown in Figure 4. The
effects here do not yet transpire into the marketplace. At the current historic levels of
corn production around 10 billion bushels, this demand shift will be by an amount of 50%
or more after including the whole 15 billion gallon ethanol mandate. This will create a
major deficit in corn supply.
The more noteworthy change is a loss of stable equilibrium price. The new
temporary equilibrium price at the intersection of the original supply and the new demand
is well above the industry long run average cost. Thus, there is economic profit in the
industry and from the theory of competitive markets, this can not exist in the long run.
Period 2
Period 2 is really a period of adjustment. After the demand has been established,
higher prices and higher profits signal to producers that the quantity supplied is too little
to meet demand. Existing producers expand production by increasing acreage, buying
higher-yielding seed or intensifying cultivation practices. New entrants also seize the
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opportunity to take advantage of profit taking in the new environment. These are the
firms which may have been priced out of the market in the past due to production costs
which exceeded the market price. In agriculture this may equate to bringing acreage into
production that is marginally productive, but essentially new supply is added to the
industry. The new supply is driven by more attractive prices that formerly discouraged
added production.
The defining aspect of this behavior is uncertainty. The relationship between the
supply and demand functions are determined by what Adam Smith termed “the invisible
hand.” In this day and age, many of the invisible fingers of the hand have been identified
and it is their behavior which remains imperfectly detectable to economists today. I
submit that the uncertainty factor may actually be the arm to which the invisible hand is
attached.
For example, if I am a corn producing farm in a stagnant market, it is fairly simple
to determine my production costs and profitability. If input costs are stable, financing is
acquired and my operating procedures established, I can predict within narrowly defined
expectations what effect the weather and other uncontrollable risks will have on my farm.
This is only possible because the uncertainty of the future of my production is limited. It
is also facilitated by my expectations for a stable market in which to sell my corn, if we
make the assumption that it is so.
However, even if the market is established or expanded, such as it is with the
RFS, the uncertainty may cause me to over or under-react in my production practices. For
example, if I know that demand has shifted outward, I no longer know how the
cumulative supply base is composed. I will be uncertain about the production of corn
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producers in neighboring markets whereas before, the market was stable. Will they
produce more in response to the new demand? How much more? Perhaps other areas will
more than compensate the new demand with increased supply. In that case, if my farm
increases output, then I have overproduced and the market will respond with depressed
prices. If the total supply hesitates, and I keep my production steady, then I will have
under produced, contributing to higher market prices but for a smaller quantity than I
otherwise could have been compensated.
A difficult phenomenon perpetuates this cycle of uncertainty in agriculture. Grain
crops throughout the world are produced once a year. Excepting weather, crop production
cannot be altered for that marketing year once planting has taken place. In the current
year, prices may be exceptionally high, signaling to producers to expand production.
During the idle months farmers may accumulate inputs, operating loans and labor in
preparation for taking advantage of the higher prices the next year. However, if the
industry as a whole increases output in the next year, then there may be a surplus. The
surplus will conversely discourage increased output or lead to decreased production.
While other industries may be able to react more quickly, output in agriculture is mostly
determined once a year.
There is another issue of uncertainty especially relating to corn production. In
many parts of the corn belt, corn is grown in rotation with soybeans or cotton. If more
acreage is devoted to corn at the expense of these other crops, then there may be a
shortage in those markets. This will drive prices for soybeans and cotton higher and
possibly lead next year’s producers to favor them over corn. The market will go through a
“learning curve” as it attempts to find the equilibrium price for each of these commodities
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as well as the right supply. This also occurs on the demand side. If I am a food processing
firm, how much should I pay for corn as an input? If I pay the current price with the
expanded demand, I may not get enough corn because the market will have bid the prices
higher in light of the deficit. However, if I pay a higher price, I run the risk of paying too
much and overcompensating what the market dictates.
The crux of the problem in both of these cases is a lack of an established
equilibrium perpetuated by uncertainty. The individual effects will be multiplied
thousands of times on both the supply and demand side causing the market to take huge
swings in each direction. It will continue as long as the future outcome of prices and the
overall supply-demand relationships are unknown and unreliable. In fact, each action will
lead to lesser reactions over time and this will continue until the market equilibrium is
settled. These over and under reactions are what lead the trading centers to be
characterized by increased volatility. It is the law of unintended consequences in play.
While the RFS aims to address climate change, farmer income and energy independence,
it says nothing of uncertainty or volatility.
These responses will also set off chain reactions in the farm input markets. While
resources are limited, the demand for inputs will increase sharply over existing supply.
For farmers, cash rents will rise, fertilizer prices will increase, seed will cost more labor
will be strained and farm equipment will have to stretch to increase output.
But all firms and all land are not created equal. In the case of new producers, they
are only enticed to enter the market by the higher prices. They would have previously
been excluded from the supply because their marginal costs of production were too high.
Likewise, the land which was previously not used for corn, was either more valuable
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being used for the previous crop, or as sitting idle in the CRP. Because of these two
factors, the supply will only expand until it is no longer profitable for new firms or new
acres to enter the corn market.
But the price signals in each period will determine the outcome of these effects.
With the level of demand established, each time there is a supply response, the market
will transmit a signal in the form of a temporary equilibrium price. In the next production
period, the signal will either deter or entice a change in corn production accordingly,
opening up to or excluding additional supply. This continues until the equilibrium supply
is settled and the relative price is discovered. But this price discovery will most likely be
multidirectional until the market settles, as explained by the uncertainty and behavior of
equilibrium levels. It would seem that at the time of the writing of this thesis, the corn
market is in this period 2 of price discovery.
Period 3
Period three is characterized by a few simpler but identifiable events. In the first
case, a new equilibrium is established. This is made possible by a decrease in the
fluctuations in supply and the new supply base sufficiently meeting the existing demand.
The volatility in the market is now limited to what the historical factors have always
been, such as weather, technology, etc.
In Figure 4, the most intriguing aspect of the new equilibrium is revealed. The
new price is actually very near the old price. The new price should not settle below the
old price. The new price would likely by higher than the old price, but only insomuch as
production functions of producers and corn buyers have been changed by the general
economy. Although a detailed analysis of the mathematical properties of the supply and
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demand curves will not be given here, it suffices to say that any increase in the new
equilibrium price will be limited by these factors. The price cannot magically increase
over historic levels beyond inflationary support and the nature of the supply, demand, and
long run average cost curves.
Method of Analysis
The three specific objectives of this thesis as set forth in chapter one are to:
1. determine if there has been a structural change in the supple, demand and price
relationship in the corn industry;
2. determine if commodity brokers believe that the futures market is still effective
tool manage price risk for their clients; and
3. determine how farm profitability and risk has changed as a result of ethanol
policy with its intended and unintended consequences.
The methods to achieve each of the objectives are now discussed. There is a separate
subsection for each objective.
Structural Change
The theoretical discussion above suggests that there should have been an initial
period of rapid price increase in period one, following the passage of the RFS ethanol
mandates. This should then be followed by a lengthier period of price volatility in period
two. At the time of this thesis being written, the corn market is in period 2. Empirical
evidence exists to substantiate the theory. Monthly corn futures prices for the nearby
contract on the Chicago Board of Trade will be evaluated over the last ten years. A plot
of these prices is instructive to look at the price increase following the ethanol mandates.
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The standard deviation of the monthly prices will also be calculated for the time period
prior to the 2005 RFS and then for the period following that time period.
From the theoretical discussion, it was also postulated that there would be shifts in
supply in period two as producers responded to increased profitability. The most
quantifiable change which commodity producers have in their power is how much
acreage to plant. Production is defined as yield per acre times acres, but yield is out of the
control of the farmer. Yield varies by technology and weather. It is true that producers are
able to influence yields through farm practices, especially fertilizer applications, but as a
general rule, commodity yields increase at a steady rate from year to year.
Acreage planted, on the other hand is in direct control of the producer-farmer. If
prices go up, for example, and lead the producer to increased potential for higher returns,
the response will typically be to expand production through plantings. This expansion
may come in the form of reduced acreage of other crops, or may extend into cultivating
marginal fields which were previously left idle (including CRP acres). But
fundamentally, there may be no better approach to measuring market behavior on the
supply side than to analyze acreage shifts. Planted acreage will be used, as this is the
factor which a producer has in his control and, therefore, it is a good measure of market
behavior. Harvested acres also provide good insight, but are less reliable since factors out
of producer control influence these numbers.
Actual acreage, the change in acreage, and the percent change in acreage from
1996-2008 will be evaluated for the top ten major crops grown in the US. Then corn
acreage changes will be evaluated over the same time period. Since corn in the south is
frequently grown in rotation with cotton and in the north in rotation with soybeans,
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acreage changes of these three crops will be looked at as well. Wheat and corn do not
typically compete for the same acres. However, an analysis of wheat acreage will also be
undertaken to see if those acres have been altered by changing corn acres.
The theoretical section suggested that during period two, supply, demand and
costs may all be changing simultaneously. Many of our economic tools, such as
measures of elasticity, are only valid when one thing changes and everything else is
constant. A primarily graphical analysis will be conducted on the corn, soybean and
wheat market evaluating the ratio of price to supply. This measures the historical
relationship between these two variables and establishes the historical norm for
proportional changes. The statistic is calculated by dividing the average price received for
the corresponding crop marketing year by total supply of each commodity in bushels
from 1970 through 2008. In order to smooth the fluctuations in these numbers, a threeyear moving average is calculated resulting in new data for 1972 through 2008. This
three-year moving average is in the analysis.
The data are divided into two time periods: Pre-RFS (1972 – 2005) and Post-RFS
(2006-2008). First, the mean is calculated for all data points in the group. Then, the
standard deviation of the set is measured. Recall the RFS was signed into law in July
2005, after that year’s crop decisions had been made. For each of these time periods, the
average deviation from the overall mean is calculated. A more localized time period is
also evaluated from 2000 – 2008 while still segregating the pre and post RFS periods.
Many participants in the corn industry have used ending stocks, or expected
ending stocks, as a key measure to predict corn price. Expected ending stocks are
defined as:
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Expected ending stocks = beginning stocks + production + imports - seed & industrial –
exports – feed & residual
where expected ending stocks are the bushels expected to remain in storage at the end of
the marketing year; beginning stocks are the prior years ending stocks; production is the
crop year annual production; imports are total imports; seed & industrial are the quantity
of the crop used for seed and for all industrial use; exports are total crop exports; and feed
& residual is the quantity used as feed. All measures are in bushels.
A smaller ending stocks or expected ending stocks are generally expected to
increase price while a larger ending stocks are expected to decrease price. The
relationship is also not likely to be linear. When stocks are expected to be very small,
price may increase substantially to effectively ration the smaller supply. On the other
hand, there has generally been some level of price support to prop up prices when the
ending stocks are very large.
The following equation is estimated using OLS regression to determine the nature
of this relationship:
(1)

PCi = b0 + b1*ESi + b2*ES2i + ei

where PC is the price of corn in dollars per bushel, ES is the ending stocks in 1,000
bushels, ES2 is ending stocks squared, e is an error term and i is a subscript for crop year
from 1989-90 to 2008-09. Prior government policy had resulted in huge stock of corn in
the mid 1980’s. This policy was changed and stocks were drawn down in the late 1980’s.
That is why stocks are evaluated since 1989. The first 14 years of data will be used to
estimate the equation and then the last six years will be predicted based on the parameter
estimates of the equation. The mean square error, MSE, will be determined and
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compared for the estimation time period, for the 2003-04 to 2005-06, and for the 2006-07
to 2008-09 time periods. MSE is defined as follows:
MSE = (PCi – predicted PCi)2/n.

(2)

Evidence of structural change will be noted if the MSE substantially differs for either
of the predicted time periods.
The ending stocks to use ratio is a key measure used by industry participants to
make price forecasts and to help guide production, storage and other marketing decisions.
It is defined as the total ending stocks divided by the total use for a particular crop. This
ratio is essentially designed to determine the number of days which an agricultural
industry could operate into the current crop year given the level of ending stocks of the
previous year. Implicitly, a smaller ending stocks should support prices because falling
stocks might indicate a shortage. Conversely, rising stocks would depress prices because
this trend might indicate an oncoming surplus. A graphical analysis will be undertaken
for corn, soybeans and wheat evaluating the stocks to use ratio and price for each of these
crops.
While ending stocks is an often used measure to predict price, it is not effective for
evaluating individual supply or demand components impact on price. The following
equation is used to evaluate the individual components impact on price and to determine
if the government mandates on ethanol use has impacted these relationships:
(3)

PCi = b0 + b1*BSi + b2*PRODi + b3*INDi + b4*FEEDi + b5*EXPi + b6*MDATEi
+ b7*INDxMDATEi + ei

where PC is the price of in dollars per bushel, BS is beginning stocks in 1,000 bushel,
PROD is production in 1,000 bushel, IND is food, seed and industrial use in 1,000
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bushel, FEED is feed and residual use in 1,000 bushel, EXP is exports in 1,000 bushel,
MDATE is a 0/1 dummy variable that takes on the value of one for the crop years 200203 though 2008-09 when federal mandated for ethanol use were imposed, INDxMDATE
is an interaction term between the government mandate and the food, seed and industrial
variable, and e and i are as previously defined in equation 1. A priori expectations are
that the parameter estimates for BS and PROD will be negative and that the parameter
estimates for IND, FEED and EXP will all be positive. If either of the parameter
estimates for MDATE or INDxMDATE are significantly different from zero, than this
will indicate a structural change in the model; MDATE being a change in the intercept
and INDxMDATE being a change in the slope of the IND parameter.
Futures Market Use
One of the objectives of this thesis was to determine if the structural changes in
the corn market and the perceived increase in volatility by industry participants were
impacting the futures market. More specifically, are traders able to still use the futures
market to hedge corn or are speculators dominating this market. Primary data will be
collected via a survey to various commodity futures brokers throughout the United States.
The survey in full can be reviewed in Appendix A. The justification for the survey is to
gauge the perspective of those closest to the market trading activities to answer the
question posed by the objective.
The brokers to be surveyed were selected from a list of those most likely to
service commercial trading demand, i.e. commodity producers, traders and users. By
selecting survey participants from this group, whether or not the commercial side of the
market is overwhelmed by new speculation may be determined. The results of the survey
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should expose whether or not there has been a tangible shift in trading activity since the
RFS. If there has been such a shift, then the claims by market participants regarding
speculation and its influence on price increases may be founded to a certain degree.
Overall, the survey was distributed to 88 country brokers selected from various
online phone directories. The criterion was to select as many as contact information was
available for independent or small brokerage firms in 17 major agricultural states. The
survey was sent via regular US mail and also via email to those brokers who had an email
address listed on their contact information. The survey could be completed on paper and
returned in the US mail or it could be completed in an on-line interactive PDF file and
returned electronically. A follow-up letter and email were also sent out to those who had
not responded, requesting their response to the survey.
Once the surveys were returned the data were entered into a spreadsheet to check
the data. Means and proportions were determined for the variables that were appropriate.
A qualitative analysis was also undertaken, as some of the questions were requesting a
written response from those surveyed.
Farm Sector
An enterprise budget for corn production from University of Arkansas
Cooperative Extension Service is employed to estimate the effects of the RFS on farm
income. A per acre analysis of costs is used in the budget. The budget was compiled for
center-pivot irrigated corn in loamy soils and includes a breakdown of variable costs and
fixed costs. Net return is calculated by subtracting variable costs plus fixed costs from
total revenue. Total revenue is calculated by multiplying yield per acre in bushels times
the price per bushel received.
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The analysis is performed for two distinct periods representing the pre RFS and
post RFS market conditions. The most significant differences between the two periods as
indicated by national data are farm-gate price received, fertilizer costs and fuel price. To
account for these changes, the same method is used for each of the three variables as
follows.
First, all factors other than price received, fertilizer price and fuel costs defined by
the published budgets are left to remain constant as given by the author. These factors are
considered relatively constant throughout both periods by the author of this thesis.
Second, for each of the variables of interest, summary statistics are calculated for the two
periods.
For the pre RFS period, an average farm gate price and the standard deviation for
monthly data is calculated from January 2000 through January 2005. For the post RFS
period, the average is calculated from January 2008 through November 2008 while the
standard deviation from January 2005 through November 2008 is used. The reason for
this difference is that the period of interest being measured here is the year 2008. Average
prices received in 2008 were higher than in 2007 and 2006. However, the relative
volatility, as measured by the standard deviation here was relatively constant from 2005
through 2008. These two statistics are more relevant to each other from a practical
standpoint. Fertilizer costs are calculated in the same way as corn prices.
Fuel price calculations are slightly different. For the pre-RFS period, the mean
used is from March 2005 through October 2005 while the standard deviation is calculated
from November 2000 through October 2005. For the post RFS period, the mean used is
for March 2008 through November 2008 and the standard deviation is calculated for
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November 2004 through November 2008. The justification lies again in practicality.
While fertilizer and corn prices are commonly contracted and locked in throughout all
times of the year, fuel is typically purchased on an ongoing and as-needed basis. Because
use of farm machinery is typically being used from March through November from year
to year (the planting to harvest months), this mean is chosen to represent more accurate
costs. The standard deviations are more uniform for the whole periods, however, which
make them more relevant to the calculations.
The Arkansas corn budget is analyzed by Simetar®, simulation and econometrics
to analyze risk. This program is an add-in for Microsoft® Excel and allows for built in
Monte Carlo simulation of outcomes based on historical data. The statistics described for
the variables above are allowed to change within the budget based on a defined
distribution. The distributions used in this analysis are all normal distributions based on
the means and standard deviations calculated by the methods described previously. The
simulation program uses the given distributions of the variables then runs a numbers of
simulated outcomes for the number of times defined by the user. The number of iterations
used in this analysis is 500. This is meant to represent 500 possible outcomes in net
return per acre based on the distribution and means of the fluctuating components with
their own calculated variability.
Data
Most of the data used in this analysis is compiled from public sources such as
various U.S. government agencies. Researchers are fortunate in this country to have
access to the vast array of data available from organizations like the USDA and others.
Most of this is secondary data and the author gives credit to the sources. Primary data
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was also collected for the market analysis section below. All the data used in this thesis
are national in scope except for the data collected from the survey.
Fundamental Analysis
All data used in the analysis of acreage shifts are compiled from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service. The agricultural statistics database was queried to obtain
statistics of the planted and harvest acres, production in bushels and the marketing year
average farm price.
The price analysis is primarily performed using price data from the Economic
Research Service at the USDA. Prices are marketing year averages for farm gate prices
received. The corn utilization for this analysis is also collected from the ERS. In all cases,
the data may be accessed at the feed grains database custom query on the internet. The
data for beginning stocks and total supply are compiled from the Foreign Agricultural
Service production supply and demand estimate online query.
The charts and data of ethanol other uses of corn were gathered from the feed
grains database at the ERS. The same price data is used as for the previous analysis.
Futures Market Analysis
The main analysis of the futures market was performed by a direct survey to 88
commodity brokers throughout 17 crop producing states. The states included in the list
were: Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and
Wisconsin. The list was compiled using phone directories for each state in the covered
area. While the list was not perfectly random, the recipients of the survey represented
most of the country brokers which could be found in local telephone directories.
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Farm Income Sensitivity
Farm gate prices used in the sensitivity analysis are gathered from the NASS
quick stats database for individual states. These prices are the monthly average farm price
for the corn in Arkansas. Fuel prices are gathered from the U.S. Department of Energy
Information Agency. The EIA maintains a database of retail level prices for various types
of fuel on a regional basis. Fuel prices used here are for PADD II, the Midwest region.
Retail diesel prices are used in place of farm diesel prices for two reasons: the price
difference will vary from state to state according to local tax schedules and these prices
will follow the exact pattern of farm diesel prices in each locality. The prices changes are
what are important in the analysis. Finally, fertilizer prices are compiled from the ERS
index of fertilizer prices accessible online.
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Chapter 5 – Results
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the shifts in fundamental factors of the
corn and related crop markets. This will begin with a look at historical corn prices,
followed by an overview of the acreage profile, a statistical analysis of the relationship
between supply and price and finally a simple breakdown of corn use and supply,
segregating ethanol use from other domestic uses of corn. Following the fundamental
analysis will be an analysis of the volatility in the corn futures market and a synopsis of
the changing structure of the futures markets from the survey of futures brokers. The last
section will review the results of sensitivity analysis performed on farmer enterprise
budgets for corn production in different producing regions.
Structural Change
This section will begin with the empirical representation of what was expected in
the theory for period one and two following the demand shock: a chart depicting a rapid
increase in monthly prices followed by a period of volatility is displayed in Figure 5. It is
quite apparent that prices rose rapidly following the 2005 and 2007 RFS mandates. This
is what was expected based on the theoretical discussion in the initial period. However,
prices have also fallen recently, indicative of moving into a period of changing supply
and demand as the market searches for a new equilibrium. It is true that general economic
conditions have deteriorated and have influenced this drop as well, but perhaps this was
only enhancing the expected effects as outlined above. The standard deviation of these
monthly prices was also calculated for the period prior to the 2005 RFS introduction and
for the period since then. The standard deviation for the pre-RFS period was 0.263 and it
was 1.326 for the post-RFS period. This empirical evidence supports the theory that
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Figure 5. Monthly average corn futures price for the nearby contract, Oct 1998-Feb 2009.
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suggested prices would become more volatile as the market searched for a new
equilibrium.
Acreage Analysis
Table 3 summarizes the acreage changes from 1996 – 2008 for a ten crop set. The
ten major crops included in this group (as defined by the ERS) are all barley, corn for
grain, all cotton, oats, all potatoes, all rice, sorghum for grain, soybeans, sugar beets and
all wheat. These crops represent the majority of food and feed commodities produced
throughout the United States which is why they were chosen. The most striking aspect of
this table is that from year to year the changes in total acres fluctuates no more than 23%. In fact, from 1996 through 2008 there was actually a decrease of approximately 9
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Table 3 . Ten Crop* Acreage Changes 1966-2008 (thousands of acres).
Year
Total Acres
Year to Year Change

Year to Year Percent
Change

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

1996

264249.1

238687.5

1997

262546.4

242375.3

-1702.7

3687.8

-0.6%

1.5%

1998

259866.9

234682.9

-2679.5

-7692.4

-1.0%

-3.2%

1999

255415.8

234721.4

-4451.1

38.5

-1.7%

0.0%

2000

259133.5

232084.4

3717.7

-2637

1.5%

-1.1%

2001

252209.4

227620.8

-6924.1

-4463.6

-2.7%

-1.9%

2002

254374.2

222284.3

2164.8

-5336.5

0.9%

-2.3%

2003

253957.9

230768

-416.3

8483.7

-0.2%

3.8%

2004

252502.2

228548.4

-1455.7

-2219.6

-0.6%

-1.0%

2005

246983.7

226448.9

-5518.5

-2099.5

-2.2%

-0.9%

2006

247187.7

218104

204

-8344.9

0.1%

-3.7%

2007

250532.1

226823.6

3344.4

8719.6

1.4%

4.0%

2008

255662.9

220912.1

5130.8

-5911.5

2.0%

-2.6%

Source: NASS, USDA
*Crops included: barley, corn for grain, all cotton, oats, all potatoes, all rice, sorghum for grain,
soybeans, sugar beets and all wheat

million acres planted. One would expect that with the RFS, there would be a net increase
in planted acreage in order to sustain the added demand. The 9 million acre decreased
acreage is about a 3% drop overall. While this does not directly represent total supply of
crops due to yield improvements over these years, it serves as a good starting point for
our analysis.
As we move toward the implementation of the RFS in 2005, we begin to see
larger swings in acreage overall, with a net increase of 3.5% from 2005 to 2008 (about
8.6 million acres). But the industry still falls short of 2000 acreage and the highest in the
set at approximately 264 million acres in 1996. But overall, we do observe three
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consecutive years of increasing planted acreage from 2005 onward. We might say that
this is the market responding to increased profitability by expanding supply.
Of course, the commodity of primary interest here is corn, summarized in table 4.
As we correlate the corn plantings with overall acreage, there is an ambiguous link. We
would expect to find that corn acreage increases concurrently with overall plantings since
corn is the crop used to meet the RFS. But the planted acreage shows a decrease, then an
increase followed by another decrease in planted acres from 2005 to 2008. This is a
contradictory signal in that one would expect there to be a continued acreage expansion
in corn. This can not be explained perfectly by the data here, but it is noteworthy that
from 2005 to 2006 there was a 4% drop in planted acres, the very year after the RFS was
first implemented. One might suspect that it may have been enacted after it was too late
to change 2006 planting decisions, but the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (which outlines the
Table 4. Acreage Shifts in Corn 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres)
Year
Total Acres
Year to Year Change

Year to Year Percent
Change

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

1996

79229

72644

1997

79537

72671

308

27

0%

0%

1998

80165

72589

628

-82

1%

0%

1999

77386

70487

-2779

-2102

-3%

-3%

2000

79551

72440

2165

1953

3%

3%

2001

75702

68768

-3849

-3672

-5%

-5%

2002

78894

69330

3192

562

4%

1%

2003

78603

70944

-291

1614

0%

2%

2004

80929

73631

2326

2687

3%

4%

2005

81779

75117

850

1486

1%

2%

2006

78327

70648

-3452

-4469

-4%

-6%

2007

93600

86542

15273

15894

19%

22%

2008

87327

78940

-6273

-7602

-7%

-9%

Source: NASS, USDA
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RFS) was signed in July of 2005. There would have been plenty of time to prepare for the
new demand.
This may explain the dramatic reaction in 2007 plantings. Here we see that
planted corn acreage was 19% higher than 2006 in 2007. In figure 6 we can also observe
that the average price of corn was $2.00 in 2005, not a signal to significantly increase
output. Therefore, acreage declined in 2006. However, in that year the average price of
corn increased to historic highs at $3.04 per bushel, a modest 50% increase over the
previous year. This would at least partially explain the rapid response in acreage in 2007.
The price-leading behavior is illustrated in the chart well. It is quite obvious, especially in
the most recent years that planted acreage positively responds to a change in price. What
is not explicit here is the decline in acres following a peak in prices for the 2007 point.
But the prices here are the average for a marketing year, whereas the plantings are
formulated once in the springtime. Although the average for 2007 may have been the
historical high, the last half of the marketing year would have fallen, leading to a lower
price in 2008. This falling price would be the signal to producers to cutback production
and decrease output in the following year. There are agronomical reasons for this
behavior as well. Soybeans and cotton are often grown in rotation with corn. Even when
a price is higher than average, farmers recognize the scientific advantages in the longterm of continuing this rotation in spite of better current prices. The acreages related to
this phenomenon are analyzed following here. Prices continued to improve, especially in
the spring of that year into the new crop marketing year, yet acreage fell by 7%. It may be
too early to tell, but was this more of a response to the anticipated feedback that 2007 was
an overreaction to market signals? There must be other factors involved. A key to
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Figure 6. Corn Price and Plantings 1996-2008.

Source: NASS, ERS

answering this question is in part revealed by the harvested acres in 2007. Favorable
conditions led to a 22% increase in harvested acres over 2006, which would have
increased supply more than anticipated. This may have led to the decline in 2008.
Returning to the inconsistent behavior of the ten crop set and corn, I will mention
again the relationship between soybeans, cotton and corn. Crops are traditionally grown
in rotation with a complementary commodity. In the case of corn, this relationship is met
by soybeans and cotton. Therefore it is necessary to explore the behavior in these market
segments as well. Figure 7 shows the inverse behavior between corn and the cottonsoybean complex. This graph plots the percentage changes in planted acreage from year
to year for corn and the sum of soybeans and cotton acres.
A quick observation can be made that these changes in acreage are almost exactly
opposite each other and would explain where the additional corn acres would be coming
from. In fact, in the most dramatic year of acreage changes for corn, 2007, we see a
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Figure 7. Changes between Corn, Soybean and Cotton Acres 1996-2008 (thousands of acres)

Source: NASS, USDA

nearly exact offsetting of acreage in the cotton-soybean complex. Table 5 shows that
while 15 million additional acres of corn were planted, cotton and soybean acres were
reduced by 16.3 million. These proportions are not always as close as this, but the fact
that this fit occurred in the sharpest year of acreage shifts is significant to note.
Concerns have also been raised in the biofuels debate regarding the effects of the
RFS on the food supply and influencing prices in the wheat markets. It is vital to
understand that corn is not typically grown in the same areas as wheat. Hence the
domestic terms “corn belt” and “wheat belt.” Agricultural markets recognize that the
growing conditions required for these two starkly different crops are just as distinct as the
crops themselves. But table 6 at least confirms that the corn acreage changes have not
been in sync with changes in wheat. At the same time that corn acres experienced years
of ups and downs in planted acreage, wheat followed the trends of the 10 crop set, for all
twelve years of these datasets. Note the 19% increase in corn plantings (15 million acres)
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Table 5. Planted Acreage Shifts in Corn, Soybeans and Cotton 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres)
Year
Total Acres
Year to Year Change
Corn

Cotton and Soybeans

Corn

Cotton and Soybeans

1996

79229

78847.5

1997

79537

1998

83903

308

5055.5

80165

85417.5

628

1514.5

1999

77386

88603.5

-2779

3186

2000

79551

89783.2

2165

1179.7

2001

75702

89843.5

-3849

60.3

2002

78894

87920.9

3192

-1922.6

2003

78603

86883.6

-291

-1037.3

2004

80929

88866.6

2326

1983

2005

81779

86277.4

850

-2589.2

2006

78327

90796

-3452

4518.6

2007

93600

74458.2

15273

-16337.8

2008

87327

83779

-6273

9320.8

Source: NASS, USDA

Table 6. Planted Acreage Shifts in Wheat 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres)
Year
Total Acres
Year to Year Change

Year to Year Percent
Change of 10 Crops

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

Planted

Harvested

1996

75105

62819

1997

70412

62840

-4693

21

-6.2%

0.0%

1998

65821

59002

-4591

-3838

-6.5%

-6.1%

1999

62664

53773

-3157

-5229

-4.8%

-8.9%

2000

62549

53063

-115

-710

-0.2%

-1.3%

2001

59432

48473

-3117

-4590

-5.0%

-8.7%

2002

60318

45824

886

-2649

1.5%

-5.5%

2003

62141

53063

1823

7239

3.0%

15.8%

2004

59674

49999

-2467

-3064

-4.0%

-5.8%

2005

57229

50119

-2445

120

-4.1%

0.2%

2006

57344

46810

115

-3309

0.2%

-6.6%

2007

60433

51011

3089

4201

5.4%

9.0%

2008

63457

56586

3024

5575

5.0%

10.9%

Source: NASS, USDA
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in 2007. The biofuel antagonists suggest that this cuts into acreage available for wheat
but in the same year wheat expanded by 5%. From 2005 - 2008, while corn decreases,
increases, then decreases again in terms of planted acreage, wheat increases for all three
years. This would suggest that the link between biofuels and raw supply of wheat is nonexistent domestically. It does not however address the issue of substitutability between
corn and wheat use. There may be an increase in wheat for livestock feed and other uses,
decreasing its availability for food. This demand side tradeoff is not explored here but
may support the food vs. fuel debate.
Price to Supply Ratio
A stark contrast between the pre-RFS and post-RFS periods is revealed. Structural
change in each of the markets is identified where the average deviation from the mean
after the RFS is much larger than before the mandates. This level of change varies
somewhat from crop to crop, but the difference is dramatic. The tables and datasets for
each crop may be found in Appendix B.
Figure 8 is a visual illustration of the price to supply ratio for corn. The fact that
this is the least dramatic of the three crops analyzed here will be shown below. But the
keys to understanding this chart are found in the spikes at different points. The peak in
1974 reflects the current events of the time. The Soviet Union was going through a period
of grain shortages and U.S. farmers were obliged to accommodate them with supplies.
That increased demand to such a point that prices increased faster than supply, raising the
ratio from lower levels. Subsequently, smaller spikes occurred in the 1980’s and 1990’s
as a result of droughts or minor changes in farm policy. The increase in 2006 is far less
dramatic. This is reflected in the production shifts outlined in the acreage analysis above.
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As price ballooned after 2006, supply expanded to the point of keeping in line with the
historic proportions of the ratio. Again, this is very different from what is observed in
soybeans and wheat.
Figure 8. Corn Price to Supply Ratio 1970-2008.

Looking on the surface, there is no identifiable structural change. But statistically
speaking, we might say there is an identifiable structural shift. For the 35 year group, the
mean was calculated at 0.2585. The standard deviation was 0.0705. In the first period
from 1972 – 2005, the average deviation from the mean was 0.04. But for the period after
the RFS, the average deviation from the mean was -0.41, indicating that the rate of
change from the mean had changed to negative compared to all 35 years and at a similar
proportion. However, this -0.41 average deviation was for 3 years versus the 0.4 for 32
years, suggesting that there might be a stronger adjustment in the later time span.
Looking at the short-term, we can see that this is true. The mean for the 9- year
group was calculated to be 0.198. The standard deviation was 0.0348. For the period
before the RFS was in place (2000-2005), the average deviation from the mean was 80

0.37. But in the period after the RFS it strengthened to 0.80. This is more than twice as
large as the previous period. It is an indication that a significant change has taken place in
the market structure after the corn ethanol mandates have been made.
Moving over to soybeans, there is some consistency with what is happening in the
corn market (see figure 9). Over the 35 year group, the mean of the price supply ratio in
the moving average is 2.471 with a standard deviation of 0.5946. For the years leading up
to the RFS, the average deviation from the mean was 0.07 compared to -.074, suggesting
that price shrank faster than supply in the years after the RFS compared to previously.
But again, the results are different when the time frame is shortened to reflect more
relevant market conditions to the time which RFS began.
Figure 9. Soybean Price to Supply Ratio 1970 – 2008

The mean of the moving average from 2000-2008 was 1.806 with a standard
deviation of 0.3423. The average deviation from the mean for the 9 year group before the
RFS (through 2005) was -0.25. But after the initiation of the RFS, an average deviation of
0.37 from the mean is observed from 2006 to 2008 compared to the 9 years as a whole.
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This implies that at least for the most recent decade, soybeans have likewise gone
through an uncharacteristic structural change in the relationship of price to supply. It is
no surprise when recalling that soybeans and corn are grown in concert with one another.
Often the production of one is at the expense of another which is why it is vital to do the
analysis on soybeans as well as corn. The consistency is evidence that there is actual
behavioral and structural change taking place, at least in the corn-soybean complex.
The same analysis must be performed with wheat. The justification is to, again,
review the possibility that the unintended effects of the RFS have transpired into other
markets, especially the other grains. For the 35 year group of data in wheat, the mean of
the moving average was 1.052 with a corresponding standard deviation of 0.2999. The
average deviation from the mean from 1970 through 2005 was -0.18. But in the case of
the years after the RFS, there is a stark difference to corn and soybeans. From 2006-2008,
the average deviation from the mean was 2.08. Of course, this would demonstrate that the
years after the RFS are sharply different for wheat than for corn and soybeans. This does
not imply causality of the RFS to the changes in wheat, but it does represent the possible
correlation between the two. Of course, as outlined below, this can be partially explained
away by the stocks to use ratio for wheat in the next section, but it is an important
question to ask. Figure 10 represents these changes for wheat.
In fact, the 9 year group may also explain away the relationship by diminishing
the significance of the correlation to wheat market changes after the RFS. The mean of
the moving average for 9 year group of wheat price to supply ratio was 1.22 and a
standard deviation of 0.4168. The average deviation from this mean was -0.50 from
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2000-2005 compared to 1.20 from 2006-2008. This presents an overall shrinkage of the
price to supply ratio changes for the decade leading into the years of the RFS compared
Figure 10. Wheat Price to Supply Ratio 1970-2008.

to the 35 year history of wheat. There is a simple reason that these changes would be
different from corn and soybeans – they are based in agronomy. Wheat is grown in drier
areas compared to corn and soybeans. The varying production conditions required for the
three crops have led to the delineation of a corn belt versus the wheat belt regions of the
United States agricultural profile.
Stocks to Use Ratio
The stocks to use ratio history for corn is different than the price to supply history
of corn. For the years from 1970 through 1999, the stocks to use ratio averages 21%.
Changes to the farm bill removed the huge stocks that were built up in the late 1980’s,
when stocks peaked in 1987 at 63%. The average for the current decade, 2000-2008,
falls to 15%. Looking closer, the low was in 2004 at 9% followed by 10% in 2007. The
ratio for 2007 would partially explain the upward support for prices that year and the
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rebound of stocks to use in 2008 to 14% would explain the slight slipping in prices there.
Figure 11 illustrates these statistics very well. Notice the inverse relationship between
Figure 11. Corn Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970-2008.

price and the stocks to use ratio. When the ratio is high, prices fall and when the ratio is
low, prices rise. This behavior confirms the laws of supply and demand. Note however,
the degree to which prices rise after the RFS from 2006-2008 as related to the stocks to
use ratio. This dramatic swing in price would support the evidence of structural change as
measured by the price to supply ratio.
Tying the stocks to use ratio into the price to supply ratio might indicate that
although the statistical change in the price to supply ratio is limited, the dramatic upswing
in price may not be fully explained. The proportion of price to supply increases at a
slower rate than in previous periods of market upheaval, but the stocks to use ratio would
indicate that there have been years with similar levels of stocks with less drastic price
changes. One would assume that the demand has been sufficiently met and the 100%
price increase is unaccounted for by a supply or demand analysis. It begs the question as
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to whether the $4 average price for a bushel of corn in 2007 is justified, and what other
factors may be influencing price changes. The correlation to the price of crude oil has
already been presented, and the reader is encouraged to refer back to chapter two where
that behavior is described.
But the stocks to use data are sharply different for soybeans, Figure 12. The
average ratio was 12% from 1970 through 2008. This includes only a couple of
insignificant outlier years in the 1980s when the ratio rose above 20%. Recall that in
corn, there were years in the 50% range. Additionally, in the most recent decade, the
average ratio only fell to 10%. In fact, after 2005, the average stocks to use werr 13%. In
the two years immediately following the RFS, the stocks to use ratio climbed from 15%
to 19% respectively and fell sharply to 7% in 2008. Interestingly, this is directly related
to the large decrease in soybean acres in support of corn as reviewed earlier. This would
have given way to a decreased soybean supply in 2007, decreased stocks leading into
2008, and therefore an historically low stocks to use ratio of 7%.
Figure 12 . Soybean Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970 – 2008
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When price is compared to the stocks to the stocks to use ratio, we observe a
major inconsistency from 2006 – 2008. At a time when stocks are rising to near-historic
levels, price is led to unforeseen increases. What we saw in corn, and what we would
expect to see in this relationship, is an inverse relationship between the two. But what this
data suggests is that a fundamental change is taking place within the soybean markets. It
also begs the question as to whether or not the supply and demand analysis can account
for the price swing. In this case, the stocks to use ration certainly does not. What will be
interesting to observe in 2009, is whether the dramatic decline in the ration will inversely
or directly correlate to price?
Wheat is more consistent with traditional economic laws. Figure 13 shows a
regular inverse pattern between price and the stocks to use ratio. What is significant about
wheat, however, is the dramatic increase in price after the RFS. There may not be more to
explore in this market when simply looking at the stocks to use ratio because the highest
Figure 13. Wheat Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970 – 2008.
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wheat prices ever seen directly correlate to the lowest stocks to use ratio in 38 years.
Compare a 38 year average stocks to use of 38% with a 29% average from 2000-2008
and 20% from 2006-2008. Again, in the lowest stocks to use ratio in 38 years of 14% in
2008, we saw the highest price ever in the same year of $6.80.
Ending Stocks and Price
Equation 1 in the methods section was estimated to determine more formally the
relationship between ending stocks of corn and corn price. Please note Figure 14 uses
ending stocks as opposed to the stocks to use ratio. Data from 1989-2002 were used to
estimate the curve depicted in Figure 14. This time period was chosen because it was
after the huge stocks were eliminated through specific farm program changes in the
1980’s. The estimated equation was:
Price = 3.8728 -0.00175*ending stocks +0.0000004*(ending stocks)2
Figure 14 Estimated Relationship between ending stocks and price of corn.
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That equation was used to predict price for the three crop years prior to the 2005 RFS
mandate, and for the three crop years since that mandate. The mean square error of the
residuals for the estimation and two predicting time periods are displayed in Table 7.

Table 7 – Mean Square Error for Predicting Corn Price from Ending Stocks

Crop Years

Mean Square Error

1989-90 to 2002-03

0.017

2003-04 to 2005-06

0.012

2006-07 to 2008-09

2.782

It is fairly evident from Figure 14 and Table 7 that the relationship between ending corn
stalks and corn price as changed since the RFS ethanol mandates were implemented. Is
this a fundamental change or is this the result of increased speculation from outside of
agricultural driving prices higher?
Corn Supply, Demand and Price
The supply of corn for each crop year is determined by the beginning stocks on
hand and prodution for that year. Imports of corn are very small averaging about .1
percent. Demand for corn is measured by three broad categories: Food, Seed and
Industrial Use; Exports; and Feed and Residual Use. Equation 3, from the Methods
section was estimated to determine the relationship of each of these broad supply and
demand categories on the price of corn. The impact of the government mandate on
ethanol use in fuel via the RFS was also included in the analysis. The results are depicted
in Table 8.
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Table 8 - Regression results for predicting the price of corn.

Parameter Estimate

t Value

Intercept

3.43171

5.11**

Beginning Stocks

-0.00097

-6.69**

Production

-0.00079

-4.94**

Seed & Industrial

-0.00012

-0.19

Feed & Residual

0.00106

2.15*

Exports

0.00098

5.17**

Government Mandate

-4.19771

-2.45*

Mandate * Industrial

0.00186

2.25*

Model Adj. R Squared

0.92

Note: * and ** denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

As economic theory would suggest, an increase in supply (Beginning Stocks and
Production) lead to a decrease in price. Both of these parameter estimates are negative
and significant at the .01 level. On the demand side, Feed & Residual and Exports are
both positive and significant. Again, that would be expected from theory. However,
Seed and Industrial is non significant and has the incorrect sign. The Government
Mandate dummy variable is significant and the interaction term between the government
mandate and the food, seed and industrial category (Mandate * Industrial) is positive and
significant. The implication from this analysis is that prior to the RFS mandates on
ethanol use the food, seed and industrial category of demand had no impact on price.
This is likely due to the fact that this category changed very little from year to year.
However, since the RFS mandate, this category has had a positive and significant impact
on the price of corn. From the standpoint of the corn growers who have lobbied
incessantly for ethanol policy, it has been a success. Corn prices have increased because
of the RFS ethanol mandates.
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Segregated Use and Price
One question that this paper is trying to answer is if the recent rise in commodity
prices are justified at their current levels. It has been shown in this paper that ethanol
production has expanded rapidly, increasing the demand for corn as an input into that
process. As implied by the stocks to use ratio, beginning stocks have remained relatively
stable in the years since the RFS. However, one observation in the chart depicted in
Figure 15 is the rapid decline in use or corn for non-ethanol purposes. This may be a
function of the price rises since 2005 causing the quantity demanded of corn in the feed
and other sectors to decline. This raises two new issues regarding the unintended
structural changes in the corn market: 1. Has the RFS caused the prices to rise and, 2. If it
is determined that RFS caused price increases, is the RFS therefore responsible for the
contracting of other sectors dependent on corn? Or, in other words, has the RFS been
implemented at the expense of other goods? How do we determine which sectors to
support and how to divert resources? Is this the role of government? The RFS is

Figure 15 – Corn Use vs. Price 1980 – 2008
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explicitly enforced to address climate change, rural economy and energy independence
issues. But who should decide what benefit to cost ratio is sufficient to support the RFS?
Futures Market Survey Results
Before continuing, the reader should review the methods employed in distributing
the survey and compiling the results to better understand what the statistics mean and
how they were calculated. In chapter 3, a study performed by Informa Economics
detailed the changing profile of futures trading participants in the BOTs as a whole.
While the Informa study was inconclusive as to the relationship between speculation and
volatility, it confirmed that there have been significant changes in the trading centers after
the RFS was implemented. The purpose of this survey was to measure those changes on
commodity futures broker activities for those who serve the commercial traders. Again, if
changes have occurred, we may identify an additional characteristic of the structural
adjustments which are the result of the RFS mandates. We may not prove causality, but
we may strengthen the notion that a correlation exists.
Overall, the survey was distributed to 88 country brokers randomly selected from
various online phone directories. The criteria was to select as many as contact info was
available for independent or small brokerage firms in 17 major agricultural states. 25
responses were received for a 28.5% response rate. 95% of respondents were registered
with the National Futures Association as introducing brokers (IB) and 1 was a certified
trading advisor (CTA). All respondents marked that their primary business activity was
brokering, except for the CTA which chose storage as their main business. No other
significant differences were documented in any of the other survey questions. The
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ranking of commodity volume traded through these firms was as follows: 1. Corn, 2.
Soybeans, 3. Wheat, 4. Live Cattle, 5. Hogs, 6. Dairy, 7. Oats, and, 8. Barley.
The respondents were first asked for whom they acted as broker in the futures
market. For all surveys returned, 91.3% said they trade for commodity producers, 73.9%
said commodity users, 69.6% said non-commercial traders, 65.2% said they trade inhouse and 47.8% said storage firms. This broadly reflects the group of brokers surveyed
in that they were desirably rural brokers who were closest to the commercial futures
trading activities. The responses were also consistent for the ranking of volume traded
through the firms on behalf of the customers. For all responding firms, the ranking was:
1. Producers, 2. Users, 3. Non-commercial, 4. In-house, and, 5. Storage firms. In the
hedonic coding, commodity user trading and non-commercial volume had very similar
rankings with averages of 2.65 and 2.7 respectively. There seemed to be no correlation to
geographical location or any other variable and the profile of these brokers’ customers.
Again, this affirms that the target group was reached by the survey.
One of the chief changes to BOTs since the RFS has been the dramatic increase in
trading volume. But a serious question which has been posed and was addressed by the
Informa study is who is responsible for the increase in volume. If purely speculators, then
extended research should be done on the effects of those participants on the price
volatility and inflationary pressure. In any case, this particular relationship should be
explored more, but this survey aimed to answer whether or not this increased volume was
partially attributable to the commercial group. In this survey, there was an overall
increase in volume across all respondents. The hedonic variable approaches 1 at 0.739.
Three respondents said there was an uncharacteristic change in volume since 2006 while
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only two reported a slight decrease in volume. Of those who reported an increase in
trading volume, 69.5% said the increased volume was for corn futures contracts. This
could be based in the expanded corn production and use as presented earlier. We can not
tell from this data. But across all data, 47.8% said these increases were from producers,
21.7% said from users, 13% said speculators and 8.69% said storage firms and another
8.69% said all traders equally. It is interesting that 47.8% said the volume increase came
from producers, given that it is producers who produced more corn recently. It is equally
significant that only 21.7% said users, as the corn use increased as much as corn
production. It may be that the users serviced by these brokers are millers or feedlots and
not ethanol plants, as those two sectors would not change their usage levels immediately
as a result of the RFS.
Participants were also asked if there had been a decrease in trading volume in any
of the major commodity futures contracts. 28.6% said they saw a decrease in live hog
contracts traded, 19.04% for both wheat and dairy contracts, and appropriately only
14.3% for corn. For the decreases in wheat and corn volume, the respondents universally
said this was from producer trades. It may be that these particular producers chose to
assume more risk in the cash market instead of hedging their crops. It would make sense
since futures and cash prices reached historic levels in the most recent few years. It also
suggests that corn trading volume has increased in considerably more firms than it has
decreased when compared to 69% saying corn trades have increased, corresponding with
the Informa study of the CFTC data.
A question regarding the volume of commodity which was hedged through these
brokers was also asked. This portion of the survey aimed to address whether or not
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commercial traders were changing their attitudes toward risk. Overall, brokers reported
that producers slightly increased the proportion of their crops which they hedged. The
hedonic coefficient for this question was 0.5 with only two respondents reporting a slight
decrease in hedged commodity. For storage firms, the proportion of their inventory
hedged increased by the same level, 0.5. But the largest increased in hedged commodity
was attributed to agribusiness clients with a slight increase and a hedonic coefficient of
0.69.
Another interesting component of this survey was whether or not these rural
brokers had seen a change in new accounts opened in their brokerage from year to year.
The average responses would indicate that there have been no radical changes in this
regard, but there was a more variable response than in other portions of the survey. The
responses ranged from uncharacteristic increases to uncharacteristic decreases. For those
responsible for opening the new accounts, 69.5% said they came from producers, 17.3%
said from speculators and 13% from users. The 17.3% new accounts from speculators
would draw special attention as the profile of respondents indicates they mostly cater to
the rural, commercial trader. If there is a significant increase in the non-commercial
traders through independent, rural brokers, additional investigation may be merited to
discover the affiliation of these participants.
Those surveyed were also asked two open-ended questions. The first was whether
or not they felt that the futures markets were functioning sufficiently to fulfill the
purposes for which they were established. These purposes are mainly price discovery and
risk management. The responses could be easily segregated into two groups of equal size.
Half of the respondents answered that the markets are running well while the other half
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said no. The explanations for the answers varied but there was some regularity of specific
objections. For those who said the markets were dysfunctional, 5 of 9 said there were
basis or convergence problems. Another 3 felt speculators, especially hedge and index
funds, were contributing to the problem. Other explanations included volatility and
problems with delivery points. There was limited specificity, but it is clear this half of the
brokers surveyed feel the markets have lost functionality. The second question dealt with
whether or not the respondents felt the level of regulation of the markets was sufficient.
In contrast, those who responded that the futures markets were accomplishing their
mission mentioned some problems which need to be addressed but the total number who
named a problem were less overall. The most common named problem was from 4 of the
9 in this group who said that the increased volatility was an issue.
The second question was meant to determine the group’s attitude was toward
regulation of the markets. There was very limited response to this question and very
erratic answers.
Clearly the results of this survey indicate that there has been a disruption of the
futures markets. A large concession is made that a major disadvantage of this survey is
that is has no method of comparing real data from the time period before the RFS.
However, as the survey is reviewed, the instructions were explicit in that each response
was to be how the broker compared the current market conditions to the prior period. An
important aspect of the survey is that all of the respondents have noticed a marked change
in market behavior and at least half feel the markets are falling short of their reason for
existence. When considering the pool of brokers reached, namely the rural independent
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brokers who are most likely to serve the commercial commodity traders, serious concern
is raised regarding the ability of the BOTs to function efficiently.
Changes to Farmer Income
Seldom in the world of economics does one thing change while all else remains
equal. This is also the case for farmers who have been the recipients of the higher
commodity prices in recent years. While we make the connection between the higher
prices and the RFS, it is difficult to directly single out the effect the desirable prices have
on net income received. In the previous chapter, the results of an increased demand for
corn were discussed. It was argued that during period 2 of the transition to accommodate
the RFS that increased demand for corn would transpire into increased pressure for
inputs. It was argued that land rents would be bid up as well as limited resources such as
fertilizer.
This is precisely what took place from 2005 to 2008. The ERS index of fertilizer
prices paid by farmers more than doubled from an average 168 to 433 in 2008. Fuel
prices reached similar levels during the same period as well, although fuel had been
increasing since before 2005. While the fertilizer price increases may be a direct result of
the RFS, fuel price increases are most likely to have increased due to macro demand
factors. In any case, these dramatic swings in cost must be accounted for when analyzing
the net income changes from pre to post RFS periods.
One characteristic of the markets of interest here is the changing structure of risk.
Here we will define risk as the exposure to variability in outcome. As the variability
increases, so does the risk. If variability increases, the market is more stable and risk has
decreased.
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Figure 16 is a graphical representation for the expected net return per acre for a
corn farm in Arkansas as plotted by a cumulative distribution function. The vertical axis
represents the total number of outcomes accounted for as moving across the horizontal
axis as measured in percent. The horizontal axis is expected net return per acre in dollars.
Statistically, the data offered here indicates that for the pre RFS period, an average loss of
$2.66 could be expected for the farms represented in this example. On the other hand, in
the post RFS period, or in 2008, the farms represented here might expect an average
return of $204.24 per acre.
The most striking characteristic of this graph is the relative difference in slope
between the pre and post RFS periods. If we consider the definition of risk offered above,
we would say that the risk structure between the two periods is dramatically different.
The sheer range of possible outcomes is much broader in the post period than before the
RFS. One of the ways this can be measured statistically is the coefficient of variance. It is
calculated by dividing the mean value for a data set by its standard deviation. A smaller
Figure 16. Net Return per Acre for Corn.
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coefficient of variance would imply a wider distribution of outcomes. The coefficients for
the pre RFS and post RFS periods here are 3.26 and .92 respectively, indicating that the
exposure of farmers to variability in net returns after the RFS is roughly 3.5 times larger
than before.
In some cases, this would cause the level of risk aversion to increase. Farmers
who focus solely on increasing costs might be deterred from excpanding output to avoid
the potential losses. In the cases analyzed here, fuel prices increased by 180% and
fertilizer prices by 142%. It is certainly true that costs have significant bearing on net
return. In fact, as a percentage of overall operating costs, fuel and fertilizer costs
increased from 12% and 22% to 26% and 29% of variable costs in these scenarios. These
input costs do seem extraordinarily high and would jusitfy farmers avoiding taking on
this risk exposure. However, the anal;ysis overall shows that the farm price increased
sufficiently to compnesate these higher costs. The most important result of this analysis
here, is the proportional effect each of these variable have on net returns. Even though
fuel and fertilizer have more than doubled, their carry into overall costs is limited by
some smaller proportion. On the other hand, when farm prices received increase, it is a
direct enhancement on total revenue.
While the outsomes in this section may seem unreasonable, recent data released
by the USDA would support these findings. The ERS records that from 2005 to 2008,
gross farm income rose from $115.2 billion to $182.1 billion. For feed crops this rose
from $24.7 billion to $61.4 billion. Fertilizer costs for all farms rose from $12.8 billion to
$27.5 billion. Fuel also increased from $10.3 billion to $16.3 billion. But after factoring
in all costs, the United States farm net income rose from $79.3 billion to $89.3 billion. At
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the time fo this writing, no specific data regarding the net income changes for a more
specific set of crops, but the author submits that most of the national increase would have
come from feed grains, substantiating the analysis done on the corn enterprise budget
above.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions
The RFS is the single largest change to come to American agriculture in at least
30 years. Although it directly affects the market for corn because of the demand for corn
ethanol, it has certainly sent reverberations throughout the farm sector. Perhaps the most
important complication of the RFS is the fact that it is such a complex issue. It is so tied
to economical, political, environmental and social issues that to measure the implications
is challenging at best.
Summary
The most obvious change to come to ag markets since the RFS was introduced is
price inflation. Never have prices for agricultural commodities reached levels as were
seen in the most recent three years of commodity marketing. In addition, Prices have
become more volatile. Whether or not this can be assigned to a causal relationship with
ethanol is not certain, but the increased correlation to the volatility of the crude oil market
is indisputable.
In addition, we may not necessarily attribute these price structure changes to the
fundamentals of commodity markets alone. Acreage shifts in each respective commodity
have been within the historical norms of behavior in terms of tradeoffs and year to year
changes. Production has seemed to keep pace with demand in the corn sector, except in
the most recent years where non-ethanol demand has slipped, most likely due to
increased prices. However, it would also seem that U.S. farmers are not responsible for
the increases in wheat prices considering that wheat acreage has not been affected by the
response to ethanol mandates. We may not know whether or not demand substitution
between corn and wheat has been a contributing factor, but production behavior has not

100

changed significantly in wheat. All these changes were predicted in our discussion of
theoretical changes in chapter four, and were greatly confirmed. In fact, the price
responses were more irregular on the fundamental side than would have been expected,
leading to the idea that some other factors were largely responsible for the structural
change. Again, while these primary responses may have been predictable and expected,
there have been other changes not intended or foreseen by policy makers.
The futures broker survey was significant in that it confirmed trading activity
changes even down to the commercial side of commodity markets. It was inconclusive as
to whether the futures markets still perform effectively, but a serious question is raised
when half of the respondents note a problem with their functioning. This may settle in the
long-term, but during this period of adjustment, trading participants must struggle to find
their feet while confirming that environments, energy security and rural economies in
general are not all that are affected by sweeping government mandates.
Finally, we have also shown a partial explanation of the USDAs findings that
farm income has increased in the most recent production years. At the same time, farm
income has become more variable from period to period and from farm to farm. Again,
this is a result of the increased uncertainty as influenced by crude oil prices and the
mandates linking farm economies to energy markets.
Implications
What is indisputable is that since the implementation of the RFS, ag markets and
especially corn have experienced volatility not observed in recent decades. This is in part
due to the inextricable link which now ties agriculture to energy. Although the energy
markets may not be so much influenced by the farm sector, agriculture producers and
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users are now exposed to the variability in energy markets. While crude oil was once a
determining factor in farm production costs, it is now also a determining factor in farm
revenue, more so than ever before.
The RFS was implemented as U.S. energy policy for many reasons. Without order
of importance, the first of these was domestic energy independence. It is difficult to
reconcile this notion, however, when considering the contrasting data regarding the
energy contribution of ethanol. The research done in this field is yet in its infancy, but
policy has jumped to the assumption that research was supportive of expanding corn
ethanol. This is still a debated issue and it should give pause to lawmakers that three
years after the initial introduction of the RFS, the topic is still not settled and has not
reached a consensus.
Perhaps more intriguing is the idea that the RFS and corn ethanol are meant to
address global climate change. Just like the energy issues, there is still no consensus
regarding the greenhouse gas emissions of corn ethanol. In fact, if longitudinal trends are
any indication of an approaching agreement, we might assume that the GHG emissions
alone are worse than gasoline. The more recent research tends to lean this way.
Additionally, there are all the other unintended environmental impacts discussed in
chapter 3 which go beyond climate change. Again, this topic is not yet settled either.
On the issue of farm income, this goal of the RFS has been attained, at least
temporarily. It has been shown, according to the economics discussion in chapter 4, that
we would expect farm incomes to increase as a result of the RFS. To add to this, the
research reviewed in chapter 3 supports the notion that rural economies have been
positively affected by corn ethanol expansion. This was all substantiated by the analysis
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given in the previous chapter. However, a daunting question remains unanswered. We
predicted that in period 3 after the market equilibrium has been settled, long run profits
would return to zero. The first two periods in the theoretical discussion have been
validated. It will only be a few years before we know whether or not our predictions of
the third period will come to pass.
Compounding the concern is the notion that the EPA may reconsider the
effectiveness of corn ethanol to battle climate change. Remember it is the EPA which has
the authority to implement the RFS, but the EPA is primarily concerned with
environmental issues and, as in the case of ethanol, not how various enterprises affect the
economy. Should the EPA reverse U.S. RFS policy, particularly the portion met by corn
ethanol, the effects on the farm sector should be considerable.
The one true economic lesson in this thesis is that, irrespective of free market
forces, government has an enormous ability to affect economic sectors. Additionally,
when government intervenes in the marketplace on behalf of a political agenda (whether
that agenda is worthy or not), the market reacts in complex ways not addressed by the
original policy. The environmental issues related to ethanol are the perfect example of
this. In the name of curbing global climate change, the U.S. energy policy was adjusted
once in 2005 then drastically more in 2007. Now, there is a new argument which says
corn ethanol harms the environment more than the fuels they were attempting to replace.
Governments can create demand, but it will always be an artificial demand not supported
by the free market. A fundamental question in economics is implicitly answered in these
cases as to how scarce resources should be rationed. The RFS decides how capital, land
and other resources are allocated and clearly has broad economic ramifications. But in the
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end, we must decide what the proper role of government should be and seek the correct
balance between social issues and issues of commerce. This thesis clearly illustrates that
the two aspects are not wholly separable and that we cannot know all the effects of one
particular policy before implementing it. These situations create unintended
consequences which eventually diminishes the efficiency of the marketplace.
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Chapter 7 – Reflections
When I first began this thesis, I really had no direction on how to approach the
topic. I was frustrated to see so many different sides of the ethanol debate focus solely on
the facts that would support their particular position. I had a personal interest in the topic
and in doing simple fact finding research I was always left wanting for information
because there was no single source which addressed the debate in full. I have come to
find that in addition to individual bias for each groups’ position, the scope of ethanol and
biofuels in general is so large that it is truly impractical to sufficiently cover all the
aspects related to it. The problem with this inherent complexity, however, is that the
socio-economic truth is in danger of being diluted in a soupy mixture of ideas and
philosophies.
What have I learned from this experience? That when an idea which has the
potential to affect so many sectors of society and economic conditions in general is put
forth, the value of forethought in implementation of related policy is inestimable.
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Futures Broker Survey
Applied Economics Department
Utah State University
The purpose of this survey is to gain an understanding of the effects that major changes in
grain markets have had on hedging and speculative activity in the futures markets.
Identifying the source and impacts of recent market changes is also of interest. Individual
survey responses will not be reported in any manner, so as to maintain complete
confidentially.
General
You or your organization are/is registered as a (Select all that apply):
FCM
IB
CPO
CTA
The primary business (respecting agricultural commodities) of your organization is:
For whom do/does you or your organization trade agricultural futures (Select all
that apply):
Producers
Storage firms
Grain Users
Non-commercial
Self
I don’t trade agricultural commodities
Please rank the following trading entities, in terms of volume handled, for whom
you act as a broker in the futures market (1 – highest volume, 5 – Lowest volume):
Producers
Storage firms
Grain Users
Non-commercial
Self (in house)
On average, how would you say the volume of agricultural commodities traded
through your firm has changed since 2003?
Which commodity contracts have experienced the most increases in volume at your
firm?
Which trading party is most responsible for these increase in volume at your firm
for that commodity?
If any commodity contracts experienced significant decreases in volume traded by
your firm, which has been the most notable?
Which trading party is mostly responsible for these decreases in trading at your
firm for that commodity?

Hedging Issues
As a proportion of a typical producer’s annual crop (for accounts handled by your
firm), the volume of contracts producers use for hedging purposes has:
As a proportion of a typical elevator company’s storage capacity (for accounts
handled by your firm), the volume of contracts elevators use for hedging purposes
has:
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As a proportion of a typical agribusiness account handled by your firm, the volume
of contracts agribusinesses employ for hedging purposes have:
Since 2003, the number of new individual trading accounts opened at your firm
annually has:
Which market trading entity represents the largest portion of these new accounts?
For non-commercial traders, which agricultural commodities are most traded
through your firm (please rank 1 – highest, 8 – lowest)
Corn
Wheat Soybeans Barley Oats Live Cattle Hog Dairy
Compared to the years before 2003, most current hedging strategies now have taken
positions that are
in duration.

Explanation section
According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the futures market
“serve the important function of providing a means for price discovery and offsetting
price risk.” In your opinion, how well do you feel this function is being performed in
recent years? Please explain.

Do you feel the current level of regulation is sufficient or insufficient to manage the
futures markets? What regulatory changes could be made to assure the integrity of the
futures markets? Please Explain.

The purpose of this survey is to gain insight and understanding regarding the recent
market volatility and changes in market behavior. It also serves as a foundation to further
measure real changes in market activities and seek understanding of the implications of
the current market conditions. Further and more in depth analysis will require real data on
a firm by firm basis. Would your organization be willing to participate in a more detailed
survey by providing specific proprietary data to enhance the accuracy of such a study?
Any data received will be kept in the strictest confidence.
Yes
No
If yes, who is the best person to contact?__________________________________
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If you are interested in receiving a summary report of the findings of this survey, please
complete the address below. Once again, no attempt will be made to tie the address to
the answers given. Information from this last page will be coded in a separate file from
the data.
Name ________________________________________
Address ______________________________________
Address ______________________________________
City, ST Zip ___________________________________
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Year

Planted Acres
(1000 acres)

Beginning Stocks
(1000 bu.)

Production
(1000 bu.)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

66863
74179
67126
72253
77935
78719
84588
84328
81675
81394
84043
84097
81857
60207
80517
83398
76580
66200
67717
72322
74166
75957
79311
73239
78921
71479
79229
79537
80165
77386
79551
75702
78894
78603
80929
81779
78327
93600
87327

1003
662
1124
706
483
557
632
1133
1433
1706
2030
1389
2531
3516
1004
1645
4031
4871
4250
1926
1342
1518
1098
2109
848
1555
425
881
1305
1783
1714
1895
1593
1084
956
2110
1963
1301
1621

4144
5634
5568
5659
4692
5829
6276
6491
7253
7912
6625
8102
8218
4166
7656
8857
8209
7116
4918
7516
7917
7459
9457
6324
10029
7385
9213
9188
9738
9411
9894
9483
8948
10066
11781
11089
10509
13011
12076

Corn –
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios
Imports
Total Supply
Use
National Average Price
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(U.S. dollars)
4
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
2
2
10
2
3
3
2
3
20
7
21
10
16
13
9
19
15
7
10
14
14
11
9
12
20
15

5151
6297
6693
6366
5176
6387
6910
7627
8687
9618
8656
9491
10750
7683
8662
10511
12241
11991
9171
9444
9262
8997
10562
8454
10887
8956
9651
10078
11062
11209
11615
11388
10555
11165
12748
13207
12484
14331
13712

4495
5187
6000
5896
4826
5767
5789
6207
6995
7604
7282
6975
7249
6693
7032
6494
7385
7757
7260
8120
7761
7915
8471
7621
9352
8548
8789
8791
9298
9515
9740
9815
9491
10230
10661
11268
11207
12737
12000

1

1.33
1.08
1.57
2.55
3.02
2.54
2.15
2.02
2.25
2.52
3.11
2.5
2.55
3.21
2.63
2.23
1.5
1.94
2.54
2.36
2.28
2.37
2.07
2.5
2.26
3.24
2.71
2.43
1.94
1.82
1.85
1.97
2.32
2.42
2.06
2
3.04
4.2
3.9

Price:Supply
(times 1000)

Price:Supply
3 Year Moving Average

Deviations
from the
mean

0.2582
0.1715
0.2346
0.4005
0.5834
0.3977
0.3111
0.2648
0.2590
0.2620
0.3593
0.2634
0.2372
0.4178
0.3036
0.2121
0.1225
0.1618
0.2770
0.2499
0.2462
0.2634
0.1960
0.2957
0.2076
0.3618
0.2808
0.2411
0.1754
0.1624
0.1593
0.1730
0.2198
0.2168
0.1616
0.1514
0.2435
0.2931
0.2844

0.2214
0.2689
0.4062
0.4606
0.4307
0.3246
0.2783
0.2620
0.2934
0.2949
0.2866
0.3061
0.3196
0.3112
0.2128
0.1655
0.1871
0.2295
0.2577
0.2532
0.2352
0.2517
0.2331
0.2884
0.2834
0.2946
0.2324
0.1930
0.1657
0.1649
0.1840
0.2032
0.1994
0.1766
0.1855
0.2293
0.2737

-0.53
0.15
2.09
2.87
2.44
0.94
0.28
0.05
0.50
0.52
0.40
0.68
0.87
0.75
-0.65
-1.32
-1.01
-0.41
-0.01
-0.08
-0.33
-0.10
-0.36
0.42
0.35
0.51
-0.37
-0.93
-1.32
-1.33
-1.06
-0.78
-0.84
-1.16
-1.03
-0.41
0.22

Year

Planted Acres
(1000 acres)

Beginning Stocks
(1000 bu.)

Production
(1000 bu.)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

43082
43476
46866
56549
52479
54590
50269
58978
64708
71411
69930
67543
70884
63779
67755
63145
60405
58180
58840
60820
57795
59180
59180
60085
61620
62495
64195
70005
72025
73730
74266
74075
73963
73404
75208
72032
75522
63631
74533

42249
42705
45683
55667
51341
53617
49401
57830
63663
70343
67813
66163
69442
62525
66113
61599
58312
57172
57373
59538
56512
58011
58233
57307
60809
61544
63349
69110
70441
72446
72408
72975
72497
72476
73958
71251
74602
62820
72121

246
106
77
64
183
201
262
110
172
188
383
335
272
368
188
338
573
467
323
195
256
352
298
313
224
358
196
141
214
373
310
265
222
191
120
273
480
614
219

Soybeans –
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios
Imports
Total Supply
Use
National Average Price
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(U.S. dollars)
1127.1
1176.101
1270.608
1547.543
1216.287
1548.344
1288.608
1767.267
1868.754
2260.665
1797.543
1989.11
2190.297
1635.772
1860.863
2099.056
1942.558
1937.722
1548.841
1923.666
1925.947
1986.539
2190.354
1869.718
2514.869
2174.254
2380.274
2688.75
2741.014
2653.758
2757.81
2890.682
2756.147
2453.845
3123.79
3068.342
3196.726
2677.117
2959.174

1451
1363
1435
1718
1483
1857
1640
2000
2170
2605
2305
2461
2614
2117
2178
2582
2650
2540
1983
2254
2319
2479
2642
2318
2918
2687
2751
3021
3147
3214
3263
3358
3174
2820
3466
3558
3908
3486
3393

1345
1286
1372
1536
1282
1595
1530
1827
1983
2222
1970
2189
2245
1929
1840
2009
2183
2216
1789
1998
1967
2182
2329
2095
2560
2491
2610
2807
2775
2904
2998
3136
2984
2700
3193
3077
3294
3267
3195

1

2.85
3.03
4.37
5.68
6.64
4.92
6.81
5.88
6.66
6.29
7.6
6.07
5.71
7.83
5.84
5.05
4.78
5.88
7.42
5.69
5.74
5.58
5.56
6.4
5.48
6.72
7.35
6.47
4.93
4.63
4.54
4.38
5.53
7.34
5.74
5.66
6.43
10.1
9.25

Price:Supply
(times 1000)

Price:Supply
3 Year Moving Average

Deviations
from the
mean

1.9644
2.2229
3.0443
3.3054
4.4774
2.6499
4.1534
2.9406
3.0686
2.4148
3.2969
2.4661
2.1845
3.6980
2.6817
1.9560
1.8039
2.3153
3.7413
2.5243
2.4756
2.2505
2.1046
2.7605
1.8778
2.5005
2.6722
2.1417
1.5663
1.4404
1.3915
1.3043
1.7421
2.6026
1.6560
1.5909
1.6453
2.8970
2.7264

2.4105
2.8575
3.6090
3.4776
3.7602
3.2480
3.3876
2.8080
2.9268
2.7259
2.6492
2.7828
2.8547
2.7786
2.1472
2.0251
2.6202
2.8603
2.9138
2.4168
2.2769
2.3719
2.2476
2.3796
2.3502
2.4381
2.1267
1.7161
1.4661
1.3787
1.4793
1.8830
2.0003
1.9499
1.6308
2.0444
2.4229

-0.10
0.65
1.91
1.69
2.17
1.31
1.54
0.57
0.77
0.43
0.30
0.52
0.65
0.52
-0.54
-0.75
0.25
0.65
0.74
-0.09
-0.33
-0.17
-0.38
-0.15
-0.20
-0.06
-0.58
-1.27
-1.69
-1.84
-1.67
-0.99
-0.79
-0.88
-1.41
-0.72
-0.08

Year

Planted Acres
(1000 acres)

Beginning Stocks
(1000 bu.)

Production
(1000 bu.)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

48739
53822
54913
59254
71044
74900
80395
75410
65989
71424
80788
88251
86232
76419
79213
75535
71998
65829
65529
76615
77041
69881
72219
72168
70349
69031
75105
70412
65821
62664
62549
59432
60318
62141
59674
57229
57344
60433
63457

1051
880
1053
638
364
465
712
1190
1259
988
964
1058
1240
1620
1495
1524
2037
1947
1348
750
574
928
508
567
608
542
402
474
772
1011
1015
937
831
525
584
577
611
488
327

1446
1731
1653
1829
1905
2274
2297
2187
1898
2282
2546
2978
2956
2587
2774
2592
2235
2254
1938
2178
2919
2117
2637
2562
2482
2334
2435
2653
2724
2454
2382
2082
1717
2507
2306
2249
1934
2193
2672

Wheat –
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios
Imports
Total Supply
Use
National Average Price
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(1000 bu.)
(U.S. dollars)
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
8
4
10
17
23
17
24
24
39
44
75
116
98
73
99
101
110
101
96
115
83
67
75
87
130
120
128

2498
2612
2707
2471
2272
2742
3012
3379
3160
3272
3513
4039
4204
4211
4280
4133
4295
4218
3310
2952
3531
3089
3220
3246
3188
2948
2936
3229
3606
3567
3494
3134
2631
3099
2966
2913
2675
2801
3128

1618
1558
2069
2107
1807
2030
1822
2120
2172
2308
2455
2799
2584
2716
2756
2096
2348
2870
2560
2378
2603
2581
2653
2638
2646
2546
2461
2456
2595
2551
2557
2303
2105
2515
2388
2303
2187
2474
2366

2

1.33
1.34
1.76
3.95
4.09
3.55
2.73
2.33
2.97
3.8
3.99
3.69
3.45
3.51
3.39
3.08
2.42
2.57
3.72
3.72
2.61
3
3.24
3.26
3.45
4.55
4.3
3.38
2.65
2.48
2.62
2.78
3.56
3.4
3.4
3.42
4.26
6.48
6.8

Price:Supply
(times 1000)

Price:Supply
3 Year Moving Average

Deviations
from the
mean

0.5325
0.5131
0.6501
1.5988
1.8002
1.2948
0.9064
0.6895
0.9400
1.1614
1.1359
0.9137
0.8207
0.8335
0.7921
0.7452
0.5635
0.6094
1.1239
1.2603
0.7391
0.9712
1.0062
1.0043
1.0823
1.5434
1.4647
1.0468
0.7349
0.6953
0.7499
0.8871
1.3533
1.0970
1.1464
1.1739
1.5928
2.3134
2.1741

0.5652
0.9206
1.3497
1.5646
1.3338
0.9636
0.8453
0.9303
1.0791
1.0703
0.9567
0.8559
0.8154
0.7903
0.7003
0.6393
0.7656
0.9978
1.0411
0.9902
0.9055
0.9939
1.0309
1.2100
1.3635
1.3516
1.0821
0.8257
0.7267
0.7774
0.9967
1.1124
1.1989
1.1391
1.3044
1.6934
2.0268

-1.62
-0.44
0.99
1.71
0.94
-0.29
-0.69
-0.41
0.09
0.06
-0.32
-0.65
-0.79
-0.87
-1.17
-1.38
-0.95
-0.18
-0.04
-0.21
-0.49
-0.19
-0.07
0.53
1.04
1.00
0.10
-0.75
-1.08
-0.91
-0.18
0.20
0.49
0.29
0.84
2.14
3.25

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

All Barley
10476
11061
10567
11045
8713
9373
9301
10778
9989
8116
8320
9618
9549
10411
11934
13139
13024
10929
9831
9125
8221
8941
7762
7786
7159
6689
7094
6706
6325
4983
5801
4951
5008
5348
4527
3875
3452
4018
4234

Corn for Grain
66863
74179
67126
72253
77935
78719
84588
84328
81675
81394
84043
84097
81857
60207
80517
83398
76580
66200
67717
72322
74166
75957
79311
73239
78921
71479
79229
79537
80165
77386
79551
75702
78894
78603
80929
81779
78327
93527
85982

All Cotton
11945
12355
14001
12480
13679
9478
11636
13680
13375
13978
14534
14330
11345
7926
11145
10685
10045
10397
12515
10587
12348
14052
13240
13438
13720
16931
14653
13898
13393
14874
15517
15769
13958
13480
13659
14245
15274
10827
9470

Oats
24410
21831
19990
18605
17013
16434
16620
17732
16407
13960
13381
13632
13951
20289
12414
13235
14671
17907
13907
12085
10423
8653
7943
7937
6637
6225
4638
5068
4891
4668
4473
4401
4995
4597
4085
4246
4166
3763
3217

Ten Crop Set –
Planted Acres (1000 acres)
All Potatoes
All Rice
1450
1826
1432
1826
1301
1824
1330
2181
1422
2550
1299
2833
1404
2489
1399
2261
1401
2993
1295
2890
1175
3380
1255
3827
1303
3295
1271
2190
1334
2830
1407
2512
1257
2381
1317
2356
1285
2933
1305
2731
1400
2897
1408
2884
1339
3176
1390
2920
1422
3353
1401
3121
1455
2824
1384
3125
1416
3285
1376
3531
1383
3060
1247
3334
1300
3240
1274
3022
1192
3347
1108
3384
1139
2838
1142
2761
1058
2995

3

Sorghum
16957
20547
17035
18994
17588
18080
18143
16636
16197
15277
15639
15930
16028
11880
17254
18285
15339
11756
10343
12642
10535
11064
13177
9882
9787
9429
13097
10052
9626
9288
9195
10248
9589
9420
7486
6454
6522
7712
8284

Soybeans
43082
43476
46866
56549
52479
54590
50269
58978
64708
71411
69930
67543
70884
63779
67755
63145
60405
58180
58840
60820
57795
59180
59180
60085
61620
62495
64195
70005
72025
73730
74266
74075
73963
73404
75208
72032
75522
64741
75718

Sugarbeets
1478
1406
1420
1280
1252
1595
1525
1273
1305
1161
1231
1252
1054
1081
1124
1125
1232
1267
1327
1324
1400
1427
1437
1438
1476
1445
1368
1459
1498
1561
1564
1365
1427
1365
1346
1300
1366
1269
1091

All Wheat
48739
53822
54913
59254
71044
74900
80395
75410
65989
71424
80788
88251
86232
76419
79213
75535
71998
65829
65529
76615
77041
69881
72219
72168
70349
69031
75105
70412
65821
62664
62549
59432
60318
62141
59644
57214
57334
60460
63147

Total
227226
241935
235043
253971
263675
267300
276370
282474
274040
280906
292422
299735
295498
255454
285520
282465
266931
246138
244227
259556
256226
253447
258784
250283
254444
248246
263658
261646
258444
254060
257360
250524
252692
252654
251423
245638
245941
250220
255196

Appendix C
Corn Production Budget

1

Enterprise Budget for Corn Production in Arkansas – University of Arkansas, Division of Agriculture, 2009

AMOUNT
GROSS RETURNS PER ACRE
Corn
producer share of yield
VARIABLE COSTS PER ACRE
Fertilizer
0-75-75
Urea 46%
32% N
Herbicides
Glyphosate Plus
Atrazine 4L
Irrigation pipe, install / remove
Seed
insecticide seed treatment
Drying
Custom Hire
Ground Appl Fertilizer
Ground Appl Herbicide
Custom Haul
Labor: Irrigation
Labor: Operator
Labor: Hand
Fuel
Repairs
Interest (1/2 year)
TOTAL VARIABLE COST
RETURNS ABOVE VARIABLE COST

UNIT

PRICE

PRODUCER SHARE

TOTAL

170
170

bu

$

5.71

100%

$

970.70

1
217
375

acre
lb
lb

$
$
$

139.92
0.45
0.31

100%
100%
100%

$
$
$

139.92
97.65
116.25

2
4
0
33
33
0

pt
pt
acre
thous
thous
bu.

$
$
$
$
$
$

4.25
1.38
10.30
2.06
0.20
0.19

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

1
2
170
0.0974
0.6885
0.1433
31.1759
1.00
1.00

acre
acre
bu.
hrs
hrs
hrs
gal
acre
acre

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

5.00
5.00
0.21
8.19
9.45
8.19
4.00
26.32
21.21

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

8.50
5.52
67.98
6.60
5.00
10.00
35.70
0.80
6.51
1.17
124.70
26.32
21.21
673.83
296.87

$
$
$

38.96
38.96

RETURN TO OPERATOR LABOR, LAND, CAPITAL, AND MGT*
*above returns do not include government payments

$

257.91

Producer break-even price:

$

4.19

FIXED COSTS/ACRE
Depreciation & Interest on equipment
Land Rent / Acre
TOTAL FIXED COST

Break-even yield:

124.8

1

